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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine facing the prospect of losing your home. Adding to your
anxiety, the mysterious entity claiming the right to foreclose on your
home is one that you have never heard of, and one that you have never
even borrowed money from.1 In fact, your original lender no longer has
anything to do with the loan secured by your home.2 You want answers.
You want to know who to talk to. But the information you seek is not in
the public record. Instead, it is either not recorded at all, or it is in the
1. See Mike McIntire, Murky Middleman: Tracking Loans Through a Firm That
Holds Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at B1.
2. See id.; see also Robert E. Dordan, Comment, Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems (MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peaceful Existence, 12
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 177 (2010) (“While borrowers may have been familiar with the
company that was servicing their mortgage loan or the bank where the loan originated,
they are often surprised to find that their mortgages are actually listed in the name of
MERS, and in many cases, that MERS may be filing a lawsuit in its own name to
foreclose on a borrower’s home.”). Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)
is a “confidential computer registry for trading mortgage loans” that was “[c]reated by
lenders seeking to save millions of dollars on paperwork and public recording fees every
time a loan changes hands.” McIntire, supra note 1. See infra Part IV for more
information on the controversy surrounding MERS.
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private records of an entity known as Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems (MERS), a private mortgage tracking system some claim was
designed by banks to confuse consumers so reckless lenders may avoid
accountability.3
A family losing its home to foreclosure faces a frightening state of
uncertainty. This uncertainty is even more frightening in California
because the state’s ambiguous laws provide little protection.4 In California,
many people take possession of their homes by giving creditors a deed
of trust.5 Creditors then often pool these deeds of trust with thousands of

3. McIntire, supra note 1 (“To a number of critics, MERS has served to cushion
banks from the fallout of their reckless lending practices. ‘I’m convinced that part of the
scheme here is to exhaust the resources of consumers and their advocates,’ said Marie
McDonnell, a mortgage analyst in Orleans, Mass., who is a consultant for lawyers suing
lenders. ‘This system removes transparency over what’s happening to these mortgage
obligations and sows confusion, which can only benefit the banks.’”). Fortunately,
Delaware has recently taken MERS to task in requiring MERS to provide Delaware
homeowners access to information about their home loans and requiring lenders using
MERS to publicly record any transfers of ownership before foreclosing on a mortgage.
See MERS Reaches Agreement with Delaware AG Biden To Provide Increased
Transparency, NAT’L MORTGAGE PROF. (July 13, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://nationalmortgage
professional.com/news30382/mers-reaches-agreement-delaware-ag-biden-provide-increasedtransparency [hereinafter MERS Reaches Agreement]. In the past few months, MERS
has begun cooperating by offering access to mortgage information free of charge to
homeowners, county officials, and regulatory officials. See FAQ, MERS INC., http://
www.mersinc.org/about-us/faq (last visited May 7, 2013). Although this is a step in the
right direction for homeowner protection, California should follow Delaware’s lead or
pass legislation to ensure MERS continues to provide homeowners access to accurate
information about their home loans. Furthermore, California must account for the deed
of trust transfers that occur outside MERS’s system.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. Deeds of trust are similar to mortgages in that they secure a loan with real
property pledged as collateral in case of default. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 1
(2011). They differ in that mortgages typically empower lenders to sell homes in
foreclosure through judicial procedures after borrowers default, whereas foreclosures
under deeds of trust allow lenders to engage in nonjudicial foreclosures. Id. § 4 (citing
Prefumo v. Russell, 83 P. 810 (Cal. 1906)). This is accomplished by way of a threeparty contract, with the lender named as the beneficiary of the loan, the borrower named
as the trustor, and a trustee that holds “title” to the property until the debt is repaid. Id.
§ 1 (citing Siegel v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 258 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1989);
Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 53 (Ct. App. 1983)). If the debt is paid
off, title passes back to the borrower. Id. Historically, courts interpreted this passage of
title under a deed of trust as an actual transfer of ownership in the property under the title
theory of mortgages. Id. But modern courts in California have interpreted deeds of trust
under the lien theory of mortgages, such that a deed of trust only creates a lien on the
property, and actual ownership remains with the borrower. Id. § 4 (citing Monterey S.P.
P’ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); Bank of It. Nat’l
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other loans and sell them to various financial institutions—all unknown
to the homeowner.6 When the homeowner fails to keep up with payments,
these entities sell the home out of court in foreclosure.7 Borrowers are
then unable to obtain important information from public records about
their home loans, such as who has the authority to foreclose on their home.8
Other states have statutes that avoid this situation by requiring all transfers
of deeds of trust to be publicly recorded prior to a valid foreclosure.9
Unfortunately, the California Legislature has not updated the foreclosure
statutes to give courts guidance and has not statutorily defined the deeds
of trust that give lenders and financial institutions the power to sell the
homes in nonjudicial foreclosure.10
In the years following the collapse of the housing market and the
recession of 2008, federal courts saw an unprecedented rise in the amount
of home foreclosures on their dockets.11 Moreover, California saw a
Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1933); Secrest v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg.
Loan Trust 2002-2, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275 (Ct. App. 2008)).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 258 (2011). Deeds of trust containing a
power of sale clause allow the loan beneficiary to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure in
which the trustee exercises the power of sale to sell the home in foreclosure. Id. (citing
Nguyen v. Calhoun, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Ct. App. 2003)). Nonjudicial foreclosures
are quicker and less expensive than a judicial foreclosure; there is no judicial oversight
absent a foreclosure challenge, and the sale is the final adjudication of the rights of the
borrower and the lender. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924–2924k (West 2012); Royal
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Cnty. Escrow, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Ct. App. 2004)).
8. See McIntire, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (2011) (“The trustee may foreclose a trust
deed by advertisement and sale in the manner provided in ORS 86.740 to 86.755 if: (1)
The trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and
any appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in the mortgage records in the
counties in which the property described in the deed is situated . . . .”); see also IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 45-1505 (2012) (“Foreclosure of trust deed, when.—The trustee may
foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale under this act if: (1) The trust deed, any
assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a
successor trustee are recorded in mortgage records in the counties in which the property
described in the deed is situated . . . .”).
10. 4 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 10:2
(3d ed. 2012) (“The deed of trust is not a true express trust. While there is a statutory
form of mortgage, there is no statutory form of deed of trust. There are no enabling
statutes that set forth the form of the deed of trust, its required provisions, or its legal
effects. However, the statutes regulating enforcement of deeds of trust implicitly
recognize their validity.” (footnotes omitted)).
11. John W. Schoen, Study: 1.2 Million Households Lost to Recession, MSNBC
(April 8, 2010, 9:53 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36231884/ns/businesseye_on_the_economy/t/study-million-households-lost-recession/ (“Brown represents one
of the more than 1.2 million households lost to the recession . . . between 2005 and 2008.
That number doesn’t include information from 2009, when job losses and foreclosures
continued to rise. So it’s likely that the full impact of the 8.4 million jobs lost and nearly
three million homes foreclosed on since the recession began has taken an even bigger
toll . . . . New foreclosures filings are running about 300,000 a month, according to
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disproportionately high level of home foreclosures compared to other
states.12 During such a time of uncertainty, one would hope California law
would provide guidance on how to address the plentiful foreclosure
challenges.13 Unfortunately, federal courts in California operated with
very little guidance, as evidenced by the recent judicial turmoil among
federal district and bankruptcy courts in California.14 The courts could
not agree on the interpretation of California Civil Code section 2932.5,
the statute requiring that assignments of mortgages be publicly recorded
prior to valid foreclosures.15 This conflict left both borrowers and lenders
uncertain as to whether a foreclosure under a deed of trust is valid when

RealtyTrac. There are currently some 5 million homeowners that are 90 days or more
past due on their mortgages . . . .”).
12. See Les Christie, California Cities Fill Top 10 Foreclosure List, CNNMONEY
(Aug. 14, 2007, 11:44 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/14/real_estate/California_
cities_lead_foreclosure/index.htm. California’s foreclosure woes were disproportionate
to many other states even before the recession aggravated the situation. Id.
13. David R. Greenberg, Comment, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage
Assignment Process and the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 253, 253 (2010) (“8.1 million homes—or sixteen percent of all mortgages—are
expected to be in foreclosure. . . . [F]oreclosure problems first appeared in the courts,
but have since garnered national attention as a result of the widespread use of
questionable evidence to establish the elements of a foreclosure.” (footnote omitted)).
14. Between 2010 and 2011, a multitude of decisions came out of the district
courts in California holding that section 2932.5 of the California Civil Code—the statute
that requires the public recording of a mortgage transfer before a valid foreclosure—
applies only to mortgages. See, e.g., Estillore v. Countrywide Bank FSB, No. CV F 10
1243 LJO GSA, 2011 WL 348832, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011); Jacobs v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. C10 04596 HRL, 2011 WL 250423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011);
Park v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 10cv1547 WQH RBB, 2011 WL 98408, at *8–9
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011); Washington v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co, No. C 10 5042 SBA,
2010 WL 5211506, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010); Caballero v. Bank of Am., No. 10
CV 02973 LHK, 2010 WL 4604031, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010); Selby v. Bank of
Am., Inc., No. 09cv2079 BTM(JMA), 2010 WL 4347629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27,
2010); Parcray v. Shea Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F-09-1942 OWW/GSA, 2010 WL 1659369,
at *12 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010); Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C 09 00040 RMW,
2010 WL 546896, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010). Despite these holdings, at least one
bankruptcy court in California held that section 2932.5 also applies to deeds of trust and
invalidated foreclosures that fail to follow the statute’s recording requirements. See In re
Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal.
2012).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 (West 2012) (“Where a power to sell real property is
given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the
payment of money, the power is part of the security and vests in any person who by
assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the instrument. The
power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged
and recorded.”).
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the assignment of the deed of trust to another beneficiary was not publicly
recorded.16
A superficial reading of section 2932.5 leads one to believe that it
applies only to mortgages, a reading that would render section 2932.5
nearly obsolete given that deeds of trust have replaced mortgages as the
preferred device for granting creditors security interests in borrowers’
properties.17 But in California, courts interpret deeds of trust as mere
mortgages with a power of sale—encumbrances that only grant a lien on
the property.18 Furthermore, there is little California common law providing
guidance to courts facing challenges to the validity of home foreclosures
based on section 2932.5.19 Undoubtedly, section 2932.5 requires that the
assignment of a mortgage be recorded for a valid foreclosure.20 But
some courts have held foreclosures under a deed of trust are valid when the
assignment to another beneficiary is not recorded,21 while others have
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The uncertainty about the validity
of foreclosures is not limited to homeowners, but also affects lenders who may see their
loans go unpaid due to the nebulous nature of the laws governing deeds of trust. Amir
Efrati, Foreclosure Challenges Raise Questions About Judicial Role, WALL ST. J., Dec.
24, 2009, at A15. In fact, the rise in foreclosures has led to a rise in what some believe is
judicial activism to alleviate the harsh consequences to homeowners as a result of the
housing market collapse, with some judges finding ways to invalidate foreclosures. Id.
17. See Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 821 (Ct. App.
2011); see also MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10.1 (“The use of a conveyance to a
trustee clothed with a power of sale offered the creditor several advantages over the
mortgage so that, by the time the distinctions between the two security instruments were
removed during the early part of the 20th century, the deed of trust had become the
generally accepted and preferred security device in California.”).
18. See Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (Ct. App. 1969)
(citing MacLeod v. Moran, 94 P. 604, 605 (Cal. 1908)). See also MILLER & STARR,
supra note 10, § 10.2 (“For trust deeds, courts generally arrive at the same conclusion as
the ‘lien theory’ traditionally applicable to the mortgage. In practical effect, if not in
legal parlance, a deed of trust is a lien on the property. The trustee has only nominal
title. Although technically title passes to the trustee under the deed of trust, the trustee
only has title to the extent necessary for the execution of the trust, and title to the property
must be reconveyed to the trustor on payment of the obligation. The reconveyance is
nothing more than a release of the lien of the deed of trust. Legal title passes to the
trustee solely for the purpose of securing the performance of the obligation, and the
trustee receives only such title as is necessary for the execution of its trust.” (footnotes
omitted)).
19. See Calvo, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 819 (“After 1908, only the federal courts have
addressed the question whether section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust, and only very
recently.”).
20. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5.
21. See Estillore v. Countrywide Bank FSB, No. CV F 10 1243 LJO GSA, 2011
WL 348832, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011) (“California’s non-judicial foreclosure
statutes do not require a recording of assignments of interests in deeds of trust prior to
foreclosure.”); Jacobs v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C10 04596 HRL, 2011 WL 250423, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (“Non-judicial foreclosures are governed exclusively by
California Civil Code section 2924-2924i.”); Park v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 10cv1547
WQH RBB, 2011 WL 98408, at *8–9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (holding that section
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held they are invalid for violating the statute.22 The language of the
California Civil Code provides little clarity.23
Because California courts hold that deeds of trust are practically only
mortgages with a power of sale in that they only place a lien on the
property, the same rules that apply to mortgages should apply to deeds
of trust.24 In order to provide the public sufficient notice about the chain
of ownership and to provide notice to the borrower on who has the power to
foreclose under a deed of trust, the assignment of a deed of trust should
be recorded for a valid foreclosure.25 The California Legislature should

2932.5 applies to mortgages, not deeds of trust); Washington v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co,
No. C 10 5042 SBA, 2010 WL 5211506, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010) (holding that
section 2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust); Selby v. Bank of Am., Inc., No.
09cv2079 BTM(JMA), 2010 WL 4347629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (holding that
section 2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust); Parcray v. Shea Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F09-1942 OWW/GSA, 2010 WL 1659369, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010) (“There is no
requirement under California law for an assignment to be recorded in order for an
assignee beneficiary to foreclose.”).
22. See In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (holding a
foreclosure under a deed of trust invalid for failure to comply with section 2932.5),
rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012); see also Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C
11 2899 EMC, 2011 WL 2654093, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (holding that failure to
comply with section 2932.5 raised serious questions about the validity of a foreclosure
under a deed of trust).
23. Adding to the confusion, the language of section 2920(b) appears to exclude
deeds of trust from the statutory rules governing mortgages in section 2924, while on the
contrary the provisions within section 2924 expressly refer to deeds of trust. See infra
Section II.B.
24. Monterey S.P. P’ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 626 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc) (“In practical effect, if not in legal parlance, a deed of trust is a lien on the
property.”); accord Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 205 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Bank
of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 945 (Cal. 1933)).
25. Although the California Legislature has not clearly stated that transfers of
deeds of trust need to be recorded, secondary sources in California indicate that the
recordings involving assignments of monetary encumbrances are required for valid
foreclosures. See, e.g., MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39. As recently as last
year, Miller and Starr’s treatise was clear in stating that “[i]n the case of a deed of trust
or mortgage with a power of sale, an assignee can only enforce the power of sale if the
assignment is recorded, because the assignee’s authority to conduct the sale must appear
in the public records.” Id. The language has since been replaced with the following:
In the case of a monetary encumbrance with a power of sale, an assignee can
only enforce the power of sale if the assignment is recorded, because the
assignee’s authority to conduct the sale must appear in the public records,
although three reported decisions now hold that this requirement applies only
to the assignment of the mortgagee’s interest in a mortgage but not to the
amount of the beneficiary’s interest in a deed of trust containing a power of
sale, because the power to sell the property in such cases is held by the trustee
of record rather than the beneficiary.
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recognize these policy concerns and provide clarity to outdated foreclosure
statutes by revising California Civil Code section 2932.5 to reflect the
changes that occurred over nearly a century in how California courts
have interpreted deeds of trust.26 The California Legislature should also
conduct a study on the validity of private recording systems and consider
whether such systems would meet the legislature’s requirements as a viable
alternative to public recording.
Part II of this Comment introduces how deeds of trust were developed
to allow the lender to avoid the judicial process by engaging in a nonjudicial
foreclosure. This Part also explains that the confusion in the courts arose
because deeds of trust are not defined in the statutes that govern them.
Part III describes the early understanding of deeds of trust in California
common law under the title theory and how California courts have
increasingly rejected the title theory in favor of the lien theory. Part IV
introduces the rise of a private alternative to public recording of
assignments of deeds of trust and how this created problems in states
that have statutes requiring the public recording of assignments for valid
foreclosures. Part V discusses the controversy that arose among the
federal courts in California due to the ambiguous nature of deeds of trust
in California’s statutes and common law and how courts have reacted to
the private recording system introduced in Part IV.
Part VI discusses solutions to the conflict, focusing on the statutory
schemes of numerous states that avoid the problem of ambiguity regarding
deeds of trust in California, and discussing how the private system of

Id. (4 Supp. 2012-2013). Miller and Starr’s revision is undoubtedly in reaction to the
recent California appellate court decisions in Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage
Ass’n, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326 (Ct. App. 2012), and Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130
Cal. Rptr. 3d 815 (Ct. App. 2011). Note that the treatise authors state that the
assignment of a monetary encumbrance with a power of sale—not just mortgages—
should be publicly recorded, but they qualify this assertion with reference to the recent
California decisions that have held this rule does not apply to deeds of trust. MILLER &
STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39 (4 Supp. 2012-2013). The treatise authors’ reference to
monetary encumbrances with a power of sale, where they could have simply used the
term mortgage, implies that these recent decisions are off track because a deed of trust is
a monetary encumbrance with a power of sale, not a transfer of title. See MILLER &
STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39; supra note 18 and accompanying text. When one pays
particular attention to Miller and Starr’s explanation that Herrera and Calvo followed the
“ancient decision” in Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P. 400 (Cal. 1908), the treatise authors’
skepticism of these recent California decisions becomes almost palpable. MILLER &
STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39 (4 Supp. 2012-2013). This Comment will demonstrate
that these recent decisions erred because they followed an “ancient decision” that applied
an understanding of deeds of trust that has long since been abandoned—the obsolete
understanding that deeds of trust transfer actual title that has been rejected by the
California Supreme Court and numerous California appellate court decisions. See infra
Part III.
26. See infra Part III.A.
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recording could avoid the controversy by allowing easy public access to
its records of assignments. Finally, this Comment concludes that, due to
the drawbacks of other solutions, the California Legislature must revise
the foreclosure statutes—particularly section 2932.5—to create a balanced
and comprehensible foreclosure system that would protect the interests
of both borrowers and lenders.
II. INTRODUCTION TO MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF
TRUST IN CALIFORNIA
Under the California Civil Code, a mortgage is a contract that creates
a lien—an encumbrance or liability on a property as security for the
performance of a debt.27 Unlike deeds of trust, mortgages are statutorily
defined instruments in the California Civil Code.28 Rather than conveying
title to the mortgagee, the mortgage is a security device that empowers
the mortgagee to initiate a judicial foreclosure on the property upon
breach of the contract to pay the debt.29 Courts of equity developed
doctrines, such as the equity of redemption, to alleviate the harsh effect
on mortgagors when they failed to fulfill their debts.30 The equity of
redemption allowed the defaulting debtor to recover his or her property
by paying the debt prior to the foreclosure sale of the property.31 Because
creditors were—and to this day in the case of mortgages still are—

27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920 (West 2012) (“(a) A mortgage is a contract by which
specific property, including an estate for years in real property, is hypothecated for the
performance of an act, without the necessity of a change of possession. (b) For purposes
of Sections 2924 to 2924h, inclusive, ‘mortgage’ also means any security device or
instrument, other than a deed of trust, that confers a power of sale affecting real property
or an estate for years therein, to be exercised after breach of the obligation so secured,
including a real property sales contract, as defined in Section 2985, which contains such
a provision.”).
28. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:2 (“The deed of trust is not a true
express trust. While there is a statutory form of mortgage, there is no statutory form of
deed of trust. There are no enabling statutes that set forth the form of the deed of trust,
its required provisions, or its legal effects. However, the statutes regulating enforcement
of deeds of trust implicitly recognize their validity.” (footnotes omitted)).
29. Id.; 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages § 1 (2011) (“The code defines a mortgage as a
contract by which specific property . . . is hypothecated for the performance of an act,
without the necessity of a change of possession. Thus, a mortgage is merely a written
contract hypothecating specific property and creating a lien for the security of a debt.”
(citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920(a))); id. § 3.
30. See MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2903
(West 2012)).
31. Id.
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restricted in their remedies for default, they had to rely on the courts to
enforce their security rights in the defaulting debtor’s property via
judicial foreclosure.32 Forcing lenders to rely on the courts to enforce
borrowers’ obligations led to the development of the deed of trust, a
device that originally purported to transfer actual title to the homeowner’s
property to a trustee until the borrower paid off the loan.33
A. Historical Understandings and Development of Deeds of Trust
During the 1800s, the deed of trust was developed to avoid the procedural
restrictions creditors faced when trying to enforce a foreclosure under a
mortgage.34 With a deed of trust, the borrower would convey actual title
and the right to sell the property to the trustee for the benefit of a lender
and beneficiary in the case of default.35 This arrangement avoided the
necessity of engaging the courts to initiate a foreclosure sale of the
property upon default.36 Instead, lenders could engage in a nonjudicial
foreclosure and sale of the property.37 Since the twentieth century, the
deed of trust has become the preferred security device in California.38 Like
mortgages, deeds of trust may be transferred or assigned, but the confusion
arises because deeds of trust are not statutorily defined, leaving the
courts to determine which statutes apply to deeds of trust when many of
them only mention mortgages.39
B. A Cause for Confusion: The Statutes That Govern Security
Devices in California Do Not Define Deeds of Trust
Deeds of trust have overtaken mortgages as the preferred security
device for real property in California, but it has been up to the courts to
interpret a century of common law to determine which sections of the

32. 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages § 3 (citing Beatty v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11 (1862)).
33. See MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1.
34. Id.
35. Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 205 (Ct. App. 2008) (“There are three parties to
a deed of trust: (1) the trustor, who owns the property that is conveyed to (2) the trustee
as security for the obligation owed to (3) the beneficiary.” (footnotes omitted)).
36. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1.
37. Id.
38. Id. (“The use of a conveyance to a trustee clothed with a power of sale offered
the creditor several advantages over the mortgage so that, by the time the distinctions
between the two security instruments were removed during the early part of the 20th
century, the deed of trust had become the generally accepted and preferred security
device in California.”).
39. Id. § 10:2; see also Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d
940, 945 (Cal. 1933) (holding that a statute that mentioned only mortgages also applied
to deeds of trust).
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mortgage statutes should apply to deeds of trust.40 The fact that mortgages
have fallen out of use compared to deeds of trust should justify revising
the California Civil Code’s sections that govern mortgages and
foreclosures. 41 Section 2920 furthers the confusion by stating:
(a) A mortgage is a contract by which specific property, including an estate for
years in real property, is hypothecated for the performance of an act, without
the necessity of a change of possession.
(b) For purposes of Sections 2924 to 2924h, inclusive, “mortgage” also means
any security device or instrument, other than a deed of trust, that confers a
power of sale affecting real property or an estate for years therein, to be
exercised after breach of the obligation so secured, including a real property
sales contract, as defined in Section 2985, which contains such a provision.42

Section 2920(a) is a clear definition of mortgage on its own terms. But
problems arise with section 2920(b) because it appears to distinguish
deeds of trust from mortgages, which are defined in section 2920(a).43
The definition of a mortgage as “any security device or instrument, other
than a deed of trust, that confers the power of sale”44 after default gives
rise to the argument that a deed of trust is not a mere security device to
secure repayment, but a change in actual ownership from the borrower to
the lender.45 However, section 2920(a) should be interpreted so that a
deed of trust is implicitly defined along with a mortgage as a contract by
which property is hypothecated to secure “the performance of an act,
without the necessity of a change in possession.” 46 Under such an
interpretation, it is apparent that the only reason the language “other
than a deed of trust” was added to define what a mortgage also means in

40. See, e.g., Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 821 (Ct.
App. 2011).
41. Oregon, for example, explicitly defines deeds of trust as mortgages and subject
to all the laws that govern mortgages except to the extent they contradict the statutes that
govern deeds of trust. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.715 (2011).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 2920(b).
44. Id.
45. See Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., CIV No. S-11-0642 KJM
EFB, 2011 WL 3818560, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920(a); see 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 118 (2012) (“When
two statutes touch upon a common subject, they are to be construed in reference to each
other so as to harmonize the two in such a way that no part of either becomes
surplusage.” (citing Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage Dist., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53
(Ct. App. 2009))).
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section 2920(b) is that deeds of trust were already defined in section
2920(a).47
Although deeds of trust are distinguished from what a mortgage “also
means” in section 2920(b),48 the question remains what a deed of trust is
if it is not defined by section 2920. Section 2920(b) indicates that a
mortgage also means a security device to secure repayment, but does not
mean a deed of trust for the purposes of sections 2924 through 2924(h)
inclusive.49 This does not mean that a mortgage is always to be distinguished
from a deed of trust, even though section 2920(b)’s language seems to
imply that sections 2924 through 2924(h) govern mortgages and not
deeds of trust.50 In fact, sections 2924 through 2924(h) explicitly refer
to and govern deeds of trust in addition to mortgages.51 Furthermore,
although deeds of trust are not defined in the code, they fall under the
overarching heading “Mortgages” in the governing sections of the
California Civil Code.52 Therefore, section 2920(b) is not distinguishing
mortgages from deeds of trust—it would be superfluous to construe

47. See 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 118 (describing how courts should harmonize
the portions of a statutory scheme to give effect to each portion).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920(b).
49. Id. In fact, courts in California hold that there is little difference between
mortgages and deeds of trust, and generally apply the same rules to mortgages and deeds
of trust. See, e.g., Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (Ct. App.
1969) (“[I]n California there is little practical difference between mortgages and deeds of
trust[,] . . . they perform the same basic function, and . . . a deed of trust is ‘practically
and substantially only a mortgage with power of sale.’ . . . [A]lthough ‘there are no
statutory provisions dictating the form or stating the effect of deeds of trust,’ deeds of
trust are analogized to mortgages and the same rules are generally applied to deeds of
trust that are applied to mortgages.” (citations omitted)).
50. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
51. For example, section 2924(a)(1)(A) reads:
(1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents
shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of each county wherein
the mortgaged or trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a
notice of default. That notice of default shall include all of the following:
(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the name
or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or instrument
number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is recorded or a
description of the mortgaged or trust property.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(1)(A) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE Analysis div. 3, pt. 4, tit. 14, ch. 2 (West 2007). Additionally,
section 2932.5 was not originally included in the provisions under the “Mortgages”
heading; it was originally under the heading “Uses and Trusts,” a section that has since
been repealed. Section 2932.5 was originally section 858 but “succeeded to § 858
verbatim as part of the 1986 technical revisions to California trust law.” In re Cruz, 457
B.R. 806, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Recommendation Proposing the Trust
Law, 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REP. 1207, 1483 (1986); Conforming Revisions,
18 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REP. 753, 764 (1985)). The Cruz court found that this
legislative history supported its finding that section 2932.5 applied to both deeds of trust
and mortgages. Id.
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mortgages in section 2920(b) to “also mean” deeds of trust because deeds of
trust should already be covered by the definition of mortgages in section
2920(a).53
III. CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF DEEDS OF TRUST: CALIFORNIA
EMBRACES THE LIEN THEORY OVER THE TITLE THEORY
Early court cases followed the title theory of mortgages, but modern
courts tend to follow the lien theory.54 Under the title theory of mortgages,
a mortgage conveys actual title, or legal estate, to a mortgagee.55 The
original title owner’s ownership in the property is severed until the loan
is paid off and the property is conveyed back to the borrower.56 But
under the lien theory, a mortgage does not separate title from the original
title owner; it simply places a lien on the property.57 The original title
owner retains ownership in the property until a purchaser obtains the
deed in a foreclosure sale after the borrower defaults on the loan.58

53. At the outset, section 2924(a) seems to preclude deeds of trust from the
definition of a mortgage: “Every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust,
made only as a security for the performance of another act, is to be deemed a mortgage,
except when in the case of personal property it is accompanied by actual change of
possession, in which case it is to be deemed a pledge.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a) (West
2012). But Miller and Starr explain that the “statutes exclude a transfer in trust from the
definition of a mortgage, but this exception only refers to an express trust. . . . The deed
of trust is not a true express trust.” MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:2 (footnotes
omitted). They go on to explain that deeds of trust are “anomal[ies]” with “none of the
incidents of a normal trust,” and that since they “began to replace mortgages as the
primary real property security device, it was recognized that trust deeds are not true
trusts but are practically and substantially only mortgages with power of sale.” Id.
(footnotes omitted).
54. See, e.g., Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930, 932–34 (Ill. 1984) (adhering to
the lien theory of mortgages and rejecting early cases that held that a joint tenancy was
severed by a mortgage because the mortgage conveyed actual title to the property to the
mortgagee).
55. Id. at 933.
56. Id.
57. Id. (“Clearly, this court adheres to the rule that a lien on a joint tenant’s interest
in property will not effectuate a severance of the joint tenancy, absent the conveyance by
a deed following the expiration of a redemption period.”).
58. Id. at 933–34 (“In Illinois the giving of a mortgage is not a separation of title,
for the holder of the mortgage takes only a lien thereunder. After foreclosure of a
mortgage and until delivery of the master’s deed under the foreclosure sale, purchaser
acquires no title to the land either legal or equitable. Title to land sold under mortgage
foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption
period and conveyance by the master’s deed.” (quoting Kling v. Ghilarducci, 121 N.E.2d
752, 756 (Ill. 1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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A. California Case Law: Recognizing a Departure from the
Title Theory of Deeds of Trust
Early on, California courts recognized deeds of trust as actual conveyance
of title to the property to the creditor or trustee.59 The debtor functionally
and legally granted title to the property to the trustee and retained only a
power of redemption upon paying off the debt secured by the note.60
The authoritative case distinguishing deeds of trust from mortgages
under the title theory was Stockwell v. Barnum.61 In Stockwell, the court
held that a deed of trust differed from a mortgage in that it actually
passed legal title to the property to the trustee, including the power to sell
the property in foreclosure without the necessity of initiating a judicial
foreclosure.62 Because legal title actually passed to the trustee, the deed
of trust was not considered an encumbrance, and it was unnecessary to
record the assignment of a deed of trust for the foreclosure to be valid.63
According to the California courts in the early twentieth century, there
was no confusion regarding the state of the law pertaining to deeds of
trust—the assignment of a deed of trust did not have to be recorded for a
valid foreclosure.64 In Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Ass’n v.
Bentley, the California Supreme Court recognized the historical distinction
between mortgages under the lien theory and deeds of trust under the
title theory.65 However, the court did so with hesitancy, adding that the
law in “nearly every state in the United States” is that deeds of trust
create only a lien, and that in an increasing number of cases, including
the California Supreme Court’s own MacLeod v. Moran, California courts
were treating mortgages and deeds of trust nearly identically.66 According
to the court, these cases, “although recognizing that ‘title’ passes in the
case of a deed of trust, emphasize the fact that the function and purpose
of the two types of security are identical, and, for that reason, apply the
same rules to deeds of trust that are applied to mortgages.”67 The court’s

59. Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P. 400, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
60. Id. (“[D]eeds of trust . . . instead of creating a lien only, as in the case of a
mortgage, pass[] the legal title to the trustee, thus enabling him in executing the trust to
transfer to the purchaser a marketable record title. It is immaterial who holds the note.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (applying California Civil Code section 858, the predecessor of section
2932.5).
64. Id. (“The transferee of a negotiable promissory note, payment of which is
secured by a deed of trust whereby the title to the property and power of sale in case of
default is vested in a third party as trustee, is not an [e]ncumbrancer to whom power of
sale is given, within the meaning of section 858 of the Civil Code.”).
65. Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 944 (Cal. 1933).
66. Id. (citing MacLeod v. Moran, 94 P. 604, 605 (Cal. 1908)).
67. Id.
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rhetorical use of quotation marks around the “title” that passes in a deed
of trust and its reference to the nature of deeds of trust in California as
“anomalous” indicate that the title theory the court followed in Stockwell
no longer reflected the true state of the law.68 The court also stated,
without disapproval, that many California decisions held that deeds of
trust were “practically and substantially only a mortgage with power of
sale.”69 Finally, although Stockwell held that a deed of trust was not an
encumbrance, the court cited Hollywood Lumber Co. v. Love,70 which
held that a deed of trust was an “[e]ncumbrance within the meaning of
the mechanics’ lien laws,” thus further demonstrating that the lien theory
of mortgages also applied to deeds of trust.71
The Bank of Italy court acknowledged that California courts were
increasingly applying the lien theory to deeds of trust and treating them
as mortgages with a power of sale despite the common law history of
following the title theory.72 But the court did not go so far as to abolish
the distinction between deeds of trust and mortgages with a power of
sale, as many other states had done.73 Nor did the court answer the
question of whether section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust as well as
mortgages.74 Instead, the court decided whether a different statute,
although only mentioning mortgages, also applied to deeds of trust.75
The court determined that, although section 726 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure only mentioned that the security must be exhausted
under a mortgage before enforcing the obligation secured by the mortgage,
the statute also applied to deeds of trust, despite the “anomalous nature
of deeds of trust” in California.76 The court’s language was far from the
rigid adherence in Stockwell to the distinction between mortgages as liens

68. Id. at 945.
69. Id. at 944 (quoting MacLeod, 94 P. at 605).
70. Hollywood Lumber Co. v. Love, 100 P. 698 (Cal. 1909).
71. Bank of It., 20 P.2d at 945 (citing Hollywood Lumber Co., 100 P. at 699).
72. Id. at 944 (“The real difficulty is caused by the fact that the courts of this state
have not followed the common-law rule.”).
73. Id. (“At common law and, in fact, in nearly every state in the United States, a
deed of trust, both in legal effect and in theory, is deemed to be a mortgage with a power
of sale, and differs not at all from a mortgage with a power of sale.”).
74. Id. at 940–41. This issue was not before the court, and thus it was unnecessary
for the court to review the holding in Stockwell. Id.
75. Id. at 945 (analyzing California Code of Civil Procedure section 726).
76. Id. The court’s analysis of whether section 726 applied to deeds of trust as
well as mortgages, even though the statute only mentioned mortgages, is analogous to
the discussion of whether section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust.
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and deeds of trust as granting title: “The economic function of the two
instruments would seem to be identical. Where there is one and the
same object to be accomplished, important rights and duties of the parties
should not be made to depend on the more or less accidental form of the
security.”77 The court’s reasoning anticipated the eventual rejection of
the title theory of deeds of trust, and subsequent California cases continued
this trend by holding that a deed of trust is simply a security device.78
Bank of Italy was not the only instance where a California court
determined that a statute, although referring only to mortgages, also applied
to deeds of trust. According to the California Supreme Court in Cornelison
v. Kornbluth, “Section 2929 of the Civil Code, though referring only to
‘the lien of a mortgage’ . . . and to the impairment of ‘the mortgagee’s
security,’ . . . applies equally to a deed of trust, since [both] are treated
similarly in California and both are considered as security interests
protected from impairment.”79 Therefore, the California Supreme Court
equates deeds of trust with mortgages, in that both are liens on a property,
and generally applies the same rules to both.80 For example, more recently,
the California Supreme Court explicitly held in Monterey S.P. Partnership
v. W.L. Bangham, Inc. that “[i]n practical effect, if not in legal parlance,

77. Id. (“[W]e do not feel justified in holding, merely because ‘title’ passes by a
deed of trust, while only a ‘lien’ is created by a mortgage, that . . . deeds of trust and
mortgages are so different that in one case security must be exhausted before suit on the
personal obligation, while, in the other, no such necessity exists. Fundamentally, it
cannot be doubted that in both situations the security for an indebtedness is the important
and essential thing in the whole transaction.”).
78. Strike v. Trans-West Disc. Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (Ct. App. 1979)
(“Here the trial court found the Strikes retained title to the property at all times. The
‘grant deed’ was simply a security device . . . .”).
79. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1975) (footnote omitted);
accord Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (Ct. App. 1969) (“[I]n
California there is little practical difference between mortgages and deeds of trust, . . .
they perform the same basic function, and . . . a deed of trust is ‘practically and
substantially only a mortgage with power of sale.’ . . . [A]lthough ‘there are no statutory
provisions dictating the form or stating the effect of deeds of trust,’ deeds of trust are
analogized to mortgages[,] and the same rules are generally applied to deeds of trust that
are applied to mortgages.” (citations omitted)).
80. See Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 987. But see Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,
130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 819 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The Stockwell court distinguished a trust
deed from a mortgage, explaining that a mortgage creates only a lien, with title to the
real property remaining in the borrower/mortgagee, whereas a deed of trust passes title to
the trustee with the power to transfer marketable title to a purchaser. . . . The holding of
Stockwell has never been reversed or modified in any reported California decision in the
more than 100 years since the case was decided.”). The Calvo court held that Stockwell
was never overruled, id., and yet the California Supreme Court in Cornelison had already
held that deeds of trust are security interests and liens, not actual transfers of title,
implicitly rejecting the legal theory upon which Stockwell was based, Cornelison, 542
P.2d at 987.
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a deed of trust is a lien on the property.”81 Although a deed of trust is
said to transfer title to the trustee—title that the trustee reconveys to the
debtor upon satisfaction of the debt—“[i]n practical effect, [this] is nothing
more than the release of the lien of the deed of trust.”82 Furthermore,
whereas the court in Stockwell held that deeds of trust were not
encumbrances,83 the Monterey court held that “mortgagees and trust deed
beneficiaries alike hold security interests in property encumbered by
mortgages and deeds of trust.”84
In 2008, in Aviel v. Ng, the California Court of Appeal explicitly rejected
the title theory of deeds of trust upon which the Stockwell court relied,
definitively holding that a deed of trust creates only a lien.85 As the
court did in Cornelison, where it found that section 2929 applied equally
to deeds of trust and mortgages although the statute only referred to
mortgages,86 the Aviel court found that a subordination clause in a lease
referring only to mortgages applied equally to deeds of trust.87 In so doing,
the court rejected the argument that a deed of trust conveys legal title
and does not create a lien, reasoning that opinions predating Bank of Italy,
such as Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Oakland Railways,88 were based

81. Monterey S.P. P’ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 626 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc).
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
84. Monterey, 777 P.2d at 627.
85. Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 205 (Ct. App. 2008).
86. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1975).
87. Aviel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 206–07 (“While there is a difference between the two
limitation periods, case law has nonetheless consistently held that the two security
instruments serve identical functions and purposes and the same rules should apply to
both.” (citing Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 20 P.2d 940, 944 (Cal. 1933))).
88. Anglo-Cal. Trust Co. v. Oakland Rys., 225 P. 452 (Cal. 1924). In AngloCalifornia, the appellant railway entered into a transaction in which it delivered a
promissory note and a deed to its property as collateral for the loan to the respondent
trustee. Id. at 453. In challenging the trustee’s foreclosure action after it defaulted on
the loan, the railway argued that the trustee was confined to seeking remedy against the
issuer of the note for the amount of the loan, and that the trustee could not initiate a
foreclosure sale of the property. Id. at 456. The appellant cited section 2888 of the
California Civil Code to argue that “a lien, or a contract for a lien, transfers no title to the
property subject to the lien.” Id. at 457 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 2888) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, the court held that because the appellant had
transferred to the respondent trustee the title to the property as collateral in the form of a
deed of trust transaction—the court referred to this as a “trust agreement”—actual title
had been transferred to the trustee. Id. The court held, therefore, that this was a transfer
in trust, such that the “entire estate and interest of the appellant in the property subject to
the trust agreement was vested as an estate, and not as a lien, in the respondent as trustee
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on “the obsolete lien versus title theory historically relied on to differentiate
the two security instruments.”89 Moreover, the court held that the title
theory “has been discredited by the more contemporary jurisprudence
. . . which functionally equates the two instruments and recognizes that a
deed of trust, for all practical purposes, is a lien on the property.”90 This
line of cases shows that Stockwell, although not overruled, is no longer
good law for the proposition that deeds of trust are not encumbrances or
liens and are instead transfers of full title.91 Accordingly, California courts
should not use the reasoning in Stockwell to resolve the foreclosure disputes.
B. The Modern Understanding of Deeds of Trust in California:
California Treatises Agree that Deeds of Trust Are
Practically Only Mortgages with a Power of Sale
Federal district court decisions conflict with the modern understanding
of deeds of trust demonstrated by the leading California real estate
treatises and the common law history of deeds of trust in California.92
Although it is true California courts have avoided completely casting
aside the legal parlance of Stockwell’s era, California Jurisprudence 3d and
Miller and Starr’s California Real Estate demonstrate an understanding
of deeds of trust in California as practically only mortgages with a power
of sale, with the same rules generally applied to both.93 Currently, according
to the accepted California treatises on the subject, there is little difference
between a deed of trust and a mortgage.94 California Jurisprudence 3d
lists several of the similarities between deeds of trust and mortgages,
stating that both mortgages and deeds of trust
are subject to the same restrictions on remedies for enforcement[;] come within
the statutory provisions governing sale under a power, judicial foreclosure, and
deficiency judgments[;] are subject to the Federal Truth in Lending Act . . .

and the trustee cannot be held to have had only a mere lien on the property.” Id.
(citations omitted). This is the title theory which the Aviel court deemed “obsolete”
when it rejected Anglo-California as outdated. Aviel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 206.
89. Aviel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 206.
90. Id.
91. Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P. 400, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
92. See supra note 14 for the numerous district court cases that held that section
2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust and that assignments of deeds of trust need not be
recorded for valid foreclosures. Contra MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39 (4
Supp. 2012-2013) (explaining that lenders must publicly record the assignments of
monetary encumbrances with a power of sale for valid foreclosures); supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
93. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 4 (2011); MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:2.
94. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 4; MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:2.
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and state consumer protection laws[; and] are included within code definitions
of “security document” and “real property security instrument.”95

According to Miller and Starr’s California Real Estate, a treatise cited
in nearly thirty California Supreme Court decisions,96 and referred to by
Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court as “a leading treatise
in the field,”97 mortgages and deeds of trust are “practically identical.”98
Mortgages with a power of sale have similar legal effects to deeds of
trust, and “[b]oth are intended to serve the same economic function of
providing security for the performance of an obligation.”99 Although both
California Jurisprudence 3d and California Real Estate recognize that
deeds of trust are functionally only security instruments and are practically
identical to mortgages, there is one major difference: in the case of a
mortgage lacking the power of sale, mortgagees are restricted to using
judicial foreclosure, whereas the holder of a deed of trust may engage in
a nonjudicial foreclosure.100
95. CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 4 (footnotes omitted).
96. See Murphy v. Burch, 205 P.3d 289, 292, 297 (Cal. 2009); Villa De Las
Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Cal. 2004); Estate of
Stephens, 49 P.3d 1093, 1096–97 (Cal. 2002); Summit Fin. Holdings, Ltd. v. Cont’l
Lawyers Title Co., 41 P.3d 548, 551, 552 (Cal. 2002); Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 15 P.3d 223, 225, 229 (Cal. 2001); Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of Cal., 11 P.3d 383,
387–90 (Cal. 2000); Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 938 P.2d 372, 386
(Cal. 1997) (Chin, J., dissenting); City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d
160, 164, 167–68 (Cal. 1996); Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d
1314, 1332–33, 1340 n.5 (Cal. 1995) (Kennard, J., dissenting); In re Morse, 900 P.2d
1170, 1181 (Cal. 1995) (en banc); State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. Superior Court,
900 P.2d 648, 661 n.3 (Cal. 1995); Bryant v. Blevins, 884 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Cal. 1994)
(en banc); Brown v. Green, 884 P.2d 55, 68 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); Locklin v. City of
Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 739 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Wozab, 800
P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1990); Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 743 P.2d 1279, 1282, 1285
n.9 (Cal. 1987); Petersen v. Hartell, 707 P.2d 232, 244 n.1 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting); Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 217 n.6 (Cal. 1985) (en
banc); Cnty. of L.A. v. Berk, 605 P.2d 381, 392–93 (Cal. 1980); Wellenkamp v. Bank of
Am., 582 P.2d 970, 975 & n.8 (Cal. 1978) (en banc); Post Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yoder,
569 P.2d 133, 135 (1977) (en banc); Buehler v. Or.-Wash. Plywood Corp., 551 P.2d
1226, 1231 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Skopp v. Weaver, 546 P.2d 307, 312 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc); Becker v. Lindsay, 545 P.2d 260, 263 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Tucker v. Lassen
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 526 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Cal. 1974) (en banc); Blank v. Borden, 524
P.2d 127, 130, 132 n.8 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
97. Petersen, 707 P.2d at 244 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
98. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1.
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 4; see supra notes 32–37 and accompanying
text.
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Given that the same rules govern mortgages and deeds of trust,101 one
would predict that California Civil Code section 2932.5 would apply to
both instruments. According to California Real Estate: “In the case of a
monetary encumbrance with a power of sale, an assignee can only enforce
the power of sale if the assignment is recorded, because the assignee’s
authority to conduct the sale must appear in the public records . . . .”102
Indeed, California Jurisprudence 3d agrees, stating: “The [trust deed]
assignee has a right to bring a foreclosure action and may exercise the
power of sale in a security instrument if the assignment is duly
acknowledged and recorded.”103 While the treatises demonstrate a modern
understanding that the title theory of deeds of trust is obsolete and that
the same rules that govern mortgages should govern deeds of trust, the
controversy among the courts shows that the legislature needs to update
the code to reflect this modern understanding.104
IV. FURTHER COMPLICATIONS: THE RISE OF PRIVATE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE PUBLIC RECORDING SYSTEM
Regardless of whether or not section 2932.5 governs deeds of trust,
there is also growing controversy over whether a lender or foreclosing
assignee must comply with the statute if the information on the assignment
is available through a private party, thereby bypassing the public recording
system.105 The public recording system is an expensive and burdensome
101. Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (Ct. App. 1969).
102. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:39 (4 Supp. 2012-2013). See supra note
25 for the discussion on how Miller and Starr, as recently as last year, stated that
assignments of deeds of trust must be recorded for a valid foreclosure and how the 2012
supplement to Miller and Starr evokes skepticism of recent California appellate decisions
that have held otherwise based on the “ancient decision” in Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P.
400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
103. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 112 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
104. See infra Part VI.
105. See, e.g., In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 824 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (“This
Court instead joins the courts in other states that have rejected MERS’ offer of an
alternative to the public recording system.”), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
Contra Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., CIV No. S-11-0642 KJM EFB,
2011 WL 3818560, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (“[T]he form language in the deed
of trust ‘does not . . . require that the nominee have the power to act only when directed
by law; rather, the nominee may act on behalf of the Lender as authorized by the deed of
trust.’ . . . However unfortunately arcane and obscure, the language does nothing more
than restate in less than clear terms that the deed of trust authorizes MERS to act on the
lender’s behalf.” (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Tapia v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
718 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 (E.D. Va. 2010))). A few of commentators have discussed the
potential dangers of allowing MERS to be recognized as a valid alternative to public
recording. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending,
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1400, 1403
(2010) (arguing, among other things, that MERS helped lead to the disintegration of the
“land title information infrastructure” and the “decline in the usefulness of public records”
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process when large amounts of mortgages or deeds of trust change hands
in a single transaction.106 Thus, a private entity known as MERS arose
as a cost-effective alternative.107
The transactions that take place in a mortgage loan, or a loan under a
deed of trust, are fairly straightforward until transfers take place.108 In

because “MERS is usurping the recording fees that once funded maintenance, innovation, and
vigilance in public recordkeeping systems”); Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against
Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) To Initiate Foreclosure
Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1635–53 (2011) (concluding that giving MERS
standing in foreclosure actions undermines homeowner protections and that “MERS’s
practice of not publically recording assignments of mortgages between MERS members
. . . will render the public land records useless by depriving the public of valuable
information, and might even insulate predatory lenders from liability.” (footnote omitted)).
106. Roger Bernhardt & Alex Volkov, Challenges to California Foreclosures
Based on MERS Transfers (May 15, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.rogerbernhardt.com/
index.php/ceb-columns/152-challenges-to-california-foreclosures-based-on-mers-transfers
(“The rise of the secondary market and its attendant multiple transfers and pooling of
loan documents led to concern over the recordation requirement of assignments of deeds
of trust and the recordation fees (and, in some states, imposition of transfer taxes).”).
107. Dordan, supra note 2, at 177 (“As of 2009, MERS was estimated to be listed as
the mortgagee of record on around sixty-million mortgages in total, and according to its
own figures, MERS is now being listed as the mortgagee of record on approximately two
out of three newly originated residential mortgages nationwide.” (footnotes omitted)).
Despite the questionable legality of using MERS as a substitute for public recording, it
may be a more effective process than the current recording system, a system which
MERS claims was not designed to handle the volume of foreclosures in our current
economy. Michael A. Valenza, Digest of Selected Articles, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 260, 260
(2011) (“With millions of Americans facing foreclosure, every element of the housing
finance system is under tremendous strain. What we’re seeing now is that the
foreclosure process itself was not designed to withstand the extraordinary volume of
foreclosures that the mortgage industry and local governments must now handle. . . .
The MERS process of tracking mortgages and holding title provides clarity, transparency
and efficiency to the housing finance system.”).
108. Bernhardt & Volkov, supra note 106. According to real estate law professor
Roger Bernhardt and co-author Alex Volkov:
[A] mortgage loan begins its existence with the borrower’s execution of a note,
promising to repay the loan, and (in California) a deed of trust, entitling the
lender to foreclose and sell the borrower’s real property if the loan is not paid.
In a plain-vanilla situation, both instruments are made out to the lender—as
payee of the note and as beneficiary of the deed of trust. The deed of trust, as a
title document, is recorded; the note, not affecting title, is not. . . . Since the
two documents represent a single loan obligation, they would sensibly be kept
together.
Id. Professor Bernhardt and Volkov go on to describe how complicated the transaction
becomes when the loan is transferred: “The deed of trust, on the other hand, should be
assigned, and perhaps physically transferred, but it is not endorsed like a note is, and its
assignment should be recorded, just as the original deed of trust was, and unlike anything
done with the note.” Id.
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addition to the complications in transferring a deed of trust, a market
developed for the transfer of large amounts of mortgage loans in pools.109
Fees and the necessity to publicly record every transfer could inhibit this
market.110 This potential problem gave rise to the perceived need for an
entity like MERS in the market of loan and mortgage transfers.111 MERS
allows lenders “a clever bypass” by putting the deed of trust “in the
name of MERS directly, as some sort of agent of the true lender, and
keeping the document under the MERS name.”112 This allowed mortgage
transfers to be “made inside MERS’s electronic database and outside the
public records” until the loan was paid off or the property was foreclosed.113
However, MERS could not simply step in as an alternative to public
recording, especially in states where recording requirements are imposed
by statute.114 Therefore, MERS also stepped in as the new beneficiary of
record in the deed of trust, even though the lender would still receive the
payments from the borrower.115 MERS’s “limited” role is to replace the
recording process and facilitate transfers of large quantities of mortgages
and deeds of trust.116 However, controversy arose as to whether MERS
has any authority to initiate foreclosures as the beneficiary under the deed of
trust.117 Indeed, it is disputed whether MERS even qualifies as a beneficiary
given its limited interest in the loan.118
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 824 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (“This
Court instead joins the courts in other states that have rejected MERS’ offer of an
alternative to the public recording system.”), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
115. See Bernhardt & Volkov, supra note 106 (“The drafting mechanism chosen to
accomplish this was the naming of MERS as ‘nominee’ and ‘beneficiary of record’ in the
deed of trust, separate from the lender.”). According to Professor Bernhardt and Volkov:
“MERS is not your lender; it is a company that provides an alternative means of
registering the mortgage lien in the public records. . . . Naming MERS as the mortgagee
and registering the mortgage on the MERS electronic tracking system does not affect
your obligation to your lender . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
116. See id. (“Unsurprisingly, MERS is not named in the note—as lender, payee, or
anything else.”).
117. Valenza, supra note 107, at 265–66 (“MERS has instituted numerous
foreclosure actions in its own name as mortgagee or assignee, to which foreclosure
defendants have presented defenses including lack of standing. Peterson’s opinion that
MERS does not have standing follows from his conclusion that MERS does not hold
legal title to the mortgage either as an original mortgagee or as an assignee.” (citing
Peterson, supra note 105)).
118. See David R. Greenberg, Comment, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage
Assignment Process and the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 253, 278–82 (2010) (discussing, among other things, “the legal reasons why a nonassignee should not be given standing to foreclose on a given property in federal court
and the policy downsides to allowing a nonassignee plaintiff to foreclose”). For more
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Mortgage lenders pay annual fees to become members of MERS and
MERS becomes their agent in order to act on all the mortgages they
register.119 The mortgages are publicly recorded with MERS named as
the nominee of the lender or mortgagee of record.120 The lenders may
then assign the beneficial ownership or servicing rights to other MERS
members.121 These assignments are tracked in MERS’s private records,
but they are not publicly recorded.122 As a result, borrowers are not notified
of transfers of beneficial ownership, only servicing rights.123 Lenders’
and financial institutions’ attempts to bypass the public recording system
has led to what some see as a decline in the public’s ability to access
information and the danger that lenders may be less accountable due to
the lack of notification regarding these transactions.124

information about the controversial role of MERS despite its limited interest in the loan,
see Peterson, supra note 105, at 1377–78. Among other things, Peterson notes that
MERS does not fund any loans. No money coming out of a MERS deposit
account is tendered as loan principal to homeowners. . . . [N]o homeowners
promise to pay MERS any money. To this effect, MERS is never identified as
the payee in a promissory note and . . . MERS is never entitled to receive the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale. Instead, these funds go to the actual mortgagee
(or assignee of the mortgagee), who is the true owner of the lien.
Id.
119. Burgett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 09-6244-HO, 2010 WL
4282105, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2010) (quoting Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy
Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 727, 741–42 (2009)).
120. Burgett, 2010 WL 4282105, at *2 (quoting Korngold, supra note 119, at 741–
42).
121. Id. (quoting Korngold, supra note 119, at 741–42).
122. Id. (quoting Korngold, supra note 119, at 741–42). MERS claims on its
website that these transfers are in fact recorded in the public records office, but MERS
does not record the assignments, it only tracks them. MERS INC., supra note 3.
Furthermore, numerous cases demonstrate that the parties transferring the deeds of trust
have failed to publicly record the assignment despite MERS’s assertions. See supra note
14.
123. Burgett, 2010 WL 4282105, at *2 (quoting Korngold, supra note 119, at 741–
42). Although homeowners are not notified of transfers of beneficial ownership, MERS
has recently begun allowing borrowers to access this information through its private
database. MERS INC., supra note 3. This is a very recent development, and the California
Legislature should take steps to ensure that MERS continues to provide such access in
order to provide adequate protection to homeowners.
124. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 105, at 1404; Robinson, supra note 105, at
1635–39, 1651–52.
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One problem with MERS is that borrowers are not notified when there
is a transfer of the beneficial ownership of the loan.125 Thus, borrowers
are often unaware of who has the power to foreclose on their property,126
and until very recently, homeowners were unable to access this information
about their home loans. In July 2012, however, Delaware became the
first state to take MERS to task and was able to secure certain concessions
from MERS to protect Delaware homeowners’ access to this information.127
Delaware’s Attorney General sued MERS and obtained MERS’s agreement
to provide a database for homeowners to find out who owns their loans
and services their deeds of trust.128 MERS members must also record
any mortgage assignments in the county recorder of deeds office before
any foreclosure can take place in Delaware.129 Perhaps in reaction to
developments in Delaware, MERS now advertises that it provides free
access for homeowners to information about their mortgages.130 Although
such concessions from MERS are a step in the right direction for
consumers, states lacking such direct promises from MERS should not
leave homeowner protection to the whims of a private organization.
Furthermore, although two-thirds of all home loans in the United States
are registered with MERS,131 borrowers that account for the other third
may lack sufficient information about their home loans in states that do
not require the recording of deed of trust assignments. California must
draft legislation to ensure adequate protection for borrowers under deeds
of trust should it choose to recognize the validity of MERS as an alternative
to public recordings.
Courts come to different conclusions as to the validity of this private
system of recording.132 In fact, MERS is a frequent defendant in cases
125. See Dordan, supra note 2, at 178–79 (“The public records will show only
MERS as the mortgagee, and it can be difficult to track down who is the beneficial owner
of the borrower’s obligation.”).
126. Id. (citations omitted) (“‘[The] transfer of an interest in a mortgage loan
between two MERS members is unknown to those outside the MERS system.’ . . . The
public records will show only MERS as the mortgagee, and it can be difficult to track
down who is the beneficial owner of the borrower’s obligation . . . ‘thereby creating the
opportunity for substantial abuses and prejudice to mortgagors . . . .’” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn.
2009); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 168 (Kan. 2009))); see also
McIntire, supra note 1 (describing how MERS obscures loan ownership).
127. See MERS Reaches Agreement, supra note 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. About Us, MERS INC., http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-us (last visited
May 7, 2013).
131. Christopher Ketcham, Stop Payment!: A Homeowner’s Revolt Against the Banks,
HARPER’S MAG., Jan. 2012, at 28, 29.
132. See In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 824 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (joining other
courts in rejecting MERS as an alternative to the public recording system), rev’d, 470
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that discuss whether a foreclosure is valid where the assignment of a
deed of trust is not publicly recorded because it champions itself as an
alternative to public recordings.133 Perhaps the MERS system is more
effective than the public recording system and states will increasingly
accept MERS as a valid substitute, but the various state legislatures must
enact this change to a private system; it is not something courts or the
private companies may change in clear opposition to the law.134 Indeed,
numerous states, such as Oregon, have statutes that require a public
recordation of an assignment prior to a valid foreclosure.135 Furthermore,
several courts have rejected MERS as a legal substitute for public recording
when statutes that require the recording are still on the books.136
B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Contra Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., CIV
No. S-11-0642 KJM EFB, 2011 WL 3818560, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011)
(“However unfortunately arcane and obscure, the language does nothing more than
restate in less than clear terms that the deed of trust authorizes MERS to act on the
lender’s behalf.” (footnote omitted)).
133. See Valenza, supra note 107, at 260, for an example of how MERS promotes
itself. Valenza also discusses the multitude of lawsuits in which MERS is named as
defendant and quotes a federal district court judge on the confusion the lawsuits are
causing for the courts: “[A]ll too often [nonjudicial foreclosures] are mystifying, because
of the utterly confusing assignments, substitutions, and other transactions (some
recorded, some not) conducted by a host of entities.” Id. at 263 (quoting Sacchi v.
Mortg. Elec. Registration Systems, Inc., CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 68007 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See, e.g., Salazar, 448 B.R. at 824 (rejecting MERS as a valid substitute for a
public recording system because the California Legislature has not yet authorized the use
of private recording systems as an alternative and stating that “overlook[ing] statutory
foreclosure requirements would require legislative action, of which the Court is not
capable”). Regardless of how effective MERS’s system is, the concern remains that the
pooling and transfer of large quantities of mortgages and deeds of trust at a rapid rate
may contribute to economic instability. See Peterson, supra note 105, at 1398 (identifying
several MERS-related factors that have enabled predatory lending and may have
contributed to the mortgage foreclosure crisis).
135. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (2011) (“The trustee may foreclose a trust
deed by advertisement and sale in the manner provided in ORS 86.740 to 86.755 if:
(1) The trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and
any appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in the mortgage records in the
counties in which the property described in the deed is situated . . . .”); see also IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 45-1505 (Supp. 2012) (“Foreclosure of trust deed, when.—The trustee may
foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale under this act if: (1) The trust deed, any
assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a
successor trustee are recorded in mortgage records in the counties in which the property
described in the deed is situated . . . .”).
136. See, e.g., Salazar, 448 B.R. at 824. In rejecting MERS as an alternative to
statutorily required public recordings, the Salazar court joined several other courts that
had done the same. See In re McCoy, 446 B.R. 453, 457 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011); In re
Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.
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V. THE INEVITABLE CONFUSION: DISTRICT COURTS
AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS BUTT HEADS
OVER SECTION 2932.5 AND MERS
California Real Estate and California Jurisprudence 3d interpret the
California jurisprudence regarding deeds of trust as defining them as
security devices, as opposed to passing actual title, and as requiring
lenders to record assignments of deeds of trust prior to foreclosures.137
Indeed, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California
came to the same conclusion in interpreting the cases that followed
Stockwell.138 But despite the California treatises’ certainty that a deed of
trust must be recorded prior to a valid foreclosure, federal district courts
in California firmly take the opposite position.139
A. District Courts in California Hold Section 2932.5
Applies Only to Mortgages
Between 2010 and 2011, a series of district court decisions, mostly
relying on Stockwell, held that section 2932.5 applied only to mortgages
and not to deeds of trust.140 In Roque v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., for
example, the court rejected the plaintiff’s theory that the challenged
foreclosure was invalid because the defendants failed to record the
assignment of the deed of trust on the property.141 The plaintiff claimed
he sought refinancing, secured by a deed of trust, for the loan on his
property from a mortgage lending company.142 The plaintiff alleged that,
after the closing of the loan, the original mortgage lender entered into a
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) with other banks and lenders
which effectively sold the plaintiff’s loan into a “pool of securitized loans

v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010); LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Lamy, No.
030049/2005, 2006 WL 2251721, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006).
137. See supra Part III.B.
138. Salazar, 448 B.R. at 820–22.
139. See Estillore v. Countrywide Bank FSB, No. CV F 10 1243 LJO GSA, 2011
WL 348832, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011); Jacobs v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C10
04596 HRL, 2011 WL 250423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011); Park v. Wachovia
Mortg., FSB, No. 10cv1547 WQH RBB, 2011 WL 98408, at *8–9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2011); Washington v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co, No. C 10 5042 SBA, 2010 WL 5211506, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010); Caballero v. Bank of Am., No. 10 CV 02973 LHK, 2010
WL 4604031, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010); Selby v. Bank of Am., Inc., No. 09cv2079
BTM(JMA), 2010 WL 4347629, at * 3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010); Parcray v. Shea
Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F-09-1942 OWW/GSA, 2010 WL 1659369, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr.
23, 2010); Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C 09 00040 RMW, 2010 WL 546896, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010).
140. See supra note 14.
141. Roque, 2010 WL 546896, at *3.
142. Id. at *1.
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comprised of thousands . . . of notes and deeds of trust of other
borrowers.”143 After the plaintiff defaulted on the loan, the plaintiff
challenged the foreclosure initiated by the new lenders and MERS, arguing
that the power of sale in the deed of trust was invalid under section
2932.5 because the assignment of the deed of trust from the original
mortgage lender was never recorded, and therefore no chain of ownership
existed.144 Nevertheless, the court held that the foreclosure under the
deed of trust was valid even though the assignment had not been recorded
prior to the foreclosure sale.145
Despite California courts applying the same rules to mortgages and
deeds of trust, the court in Roque definitively stated that “Section 2932.5
applies to mortgages, not deeds of trust. It applies only to mortgages that
give a power of sale to the creditor, not to deeds of trust which grant a
power of sale to the trustee.”146 In its reasoning, the court succinctly
supported its conclusion that trustees may “foreclose on behalf of
assignees for the original beneficiary.”147 But the court did not explain
why section 2932.5 applied to mortgages and not deeds of trust.148
Although the trend in California since Bank of Italy is to apply the same
rules that govern mortgages to deeds of trust, the court concluded that
“non-judicial foreclosures are governed exclusively by Cal. Civ. Code
Section 2924–2924i.”149

143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *3.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 708–11 (9th Cir.
1987)). In Golden Plan, the court’s holding that a trustee may “foreclose on behalf of
assignees for the original beneficiary,” id., may be important to the discussion of whether
a trustee may foreclose on a property on behalf of an assignee, but was in the context of
a bankruptcy case in which investors gave funds to a loan brokerage company to make
real estate loans, often to unstable borrowers. Golden Plan, 829 F.2d at 707. The
investors would receive “whole or partial assignments of notes and trust deeds held by
Golden Plan.” Id. Investors forced Golden Plan into bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
trustee requested that the court issue thousands of trust deeds and notes to the investors.
Id. However, the dispute in the case was primarily about the ownership interests held by
the investors and whether certain monetary advances to investors by Golden Plan were
fraudulent conveyances. Id. at 707–08. This case cited by Roque sheds little light on the
debate on whether the assignment of a deed of trust must be publicly recorded for a valid
foreclosure.
148. Roque, 2010 WL 546896, at *3.
149. Id.
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Numerous district court cases followed Roque, creating an increasing
body of authority among the California district courts.150 The cases that
followed, for example, Caballero v. Bank of America, also cited Stockwell
for its distinction between deeds of trust and mortgages, and stated that
Stockwell was “[t]he only California state court decision on point.”151 In
Aviel v. Ng, the court rejected arguments based on the title theory of
deeds of trust that predated Bank of Italy, rejecting the title theory as
outdated.152 However, Caballero quoted Bank of Italy as harmonious
with Stockwell, quoting only its mention that a “deed of trust differs
from a mortgage in that title passes to the trustee in case of a deed of
trust, while in [the] case of a mortgage, the mortgagor retains title.”153
Caballero’s and the other district courts’ analyses also lack the California
Supreme Court’s recognition, and perhaps tacit approval, of the increasingly
blurred line between deeds of trust and mortgages with a power of sale
in Bank of Italy.154 Nor do the decisions account for the holding in
Monterey S.P. Partnership v. W.L. Bankham, Inc. that, although the legal
parlance still describes the passage of “title” in regard to a deed of trust,
deeds of trust are practically only liens on the property.155 Furthermore,
150. See Parcray v. Shea Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F-09-1942, 2010 WL 1659369, at
*11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010) (“There is no requirement under California law for an
assignment to be recorded in order for an assignee beneficiary to foreclose.” (citing
Roque, 2010 WL 546896, at *3–5)); see also Estillore v. Countrywide Bank FSB, No.
CV F 10 1243 LJO GSA, 2011 WL 348832, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011)
(“California’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require a recording of assignments
of interests in deeds of trust prior to foreclosure.” (citing Parcray, 2010 WL 1659369, at
*11; Roque, 2010 WL 1659369, at *3)); Jacobs v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C10 04596
HRL, 2011 WL 250423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (“Non-judicial foreclosures are
governed exclusively by California Civil Code section 2924-2924i.” (citing Roque, 2010
WL 1659369, at *3)); Park v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 10cv1547 WQH RBB, 2011
WL 98408, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (citing Parcray, 2010 WL 1659369, at *12)
(holding that section 2932.5 applies to mortgages, not deeds of trust); Washington v.
Nat’l City Mortg. Co, No. C 10 5042 SBA, 2010 WL 5211506, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16,
2010) (citing Selby v. Bank of Am., Inc., No. 09cv2079 BTM(JMA), 2010 WL 4347629,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010); Roque, 2010 WL 546896, at *3) (holding that section
2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust); Selby, 2010 WL 4347629, at *3 (citing Parcray,
2010 WL 1659369, at *11; Roque, 2010 WL 546896, at *3) (holding that section 2932.5
does not apply to deeds of trust).
151. Caballero v. Bank of Am., No. 10-CV-02973-LHK, 2010 WL 4604031, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010) (citing Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P. 400, 402 (Cal. Ct. App.
1908)).
152. Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008).
153. Caballero, 2010 WL 4604031, at *3 (quoting Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav.
Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 944 (Cal. 1933)).
154. See id. But see Bank of It., 20 P.2d at 945 (“This view, that deeds of trust,
except for the passage of title for the purpose of the trust, are practically and
substantially only mortgages with a power of sale, in addition to the cases cited in the
above opinion, has many times been recognized in other decisions.”).
155. Monterey S.P. P’ship v. W.L. Bankham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 626 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc). The holding in Monterey should put courts on notice that deeds of trust no
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the district courts’ analyses fail to acknowledge the explicit rejection of
the title theory in Aviel.156
B. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California Holds that
Section 2932.5 Applies to Deeds of Trust in Salazar
Against a current of district court opinions with facts and holdings
similar to Roque and Caballero, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of California decided In re Salazar, in which the court
held that Stockwell was outdated and that California courts should apply
section 2932.5 to deeds of trust as well as mortgages.157 The court found
that Stockwell’s outdated distinction should not deprive borrowers under
deeds of trust from the same protections afforded to borrowers under
mortgages.158 Furthermore, the court found that section 2932.5 “protects
borrowers from confusion as to the ownership of their loans.”159 The
court also reasoned that the need to protect borrowers from confusion—
the concern addressed by section 2932.5 by identifying the assignee of
the loan—is now “more exigent, not less, than it was during the Great
Depression, when Bank of Italy was decided” because current problems
with the mortgage foreclosure process are “widely chronicled.”160 The
court noted that these problems in the mortgage process are especially
longer transfer actual title, but the opposite has proven true as the district courts fail to
even analyze Monterey in their adherence to Stockwell. See, e.g., Caballero, 2010 WL
4604031, at *3.
156. Aviel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 206. Aviel held that the title theory of mortgages, in
which actual title is transferred in a mortgage or deed of trust, was “obsolete.” Id. For
Caballero and other district courts to follow Stockwell, which was based on the outdated
title theory, ignores this important precedent. See, e.g., Caballero, 2010 WL 4604031, at
*3.
157. In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 820–22 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d, 470 B.R.
557 (S.D. Cal. 2012). The court recognized the holdings of the district court cases, but
respectfully noted that it was not bound by them. Id. at 820 n.8 (citing In re Silverman,
616 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010)).
158. Id. at 821 (“[I]mportant rights and duties of the parties should not be made to
depend on the more or less accidental form of the security.” (quoting Bank of It., 20 P.2d
at 945) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage
Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 148–49 (2008); Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the
Law, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis,
Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1430
(2010); Eric Dash, A Paperwork Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at WK5; David
Streitfeld, 3rd Lender Will Freeze Foreclosure in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010,
at B1).
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apparent in bankruptcy cases, as there are “serious distributional
consequences to all parties in a bankruptcy if a mortgagee cannot prove it
holds a valid security interest.”161 Throughout the opinion, and in stark
contrast to the district court decisions, the bankruptcy court showed a
concern for borrower protections, in addition to the danger of allowing a
gap in title.162 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the California Supreme
Court rejected the title theory of deeds of trust, and held that section
2932.5 therefore applied to deeds of trust as well as mortgages.163
In addition to holding that section 2932.5 requires lenders to record
deed of trust assignments, the Salazar court held that MERS was not a
valid alternative to the public recording system.164 The court noted that
“circumventing the public recordation system is, in fact, the purpose for
which the MERS system was created.”165 However, the court held that
the creation of a private system was “not enforceable to the extent it
departs from California law.” 166 In conclusion, the court held that
foreclosing assignees in California are obligated to record their interest
before a foreclosure sale may take place and that assignees cannot use
MERS to circumvent the requirements of section 2932.5.167
C. The Reaction to Salazar
1. Consumer Attorneys Celebrate Salazar
Naturally, foreclosure defense attorneys, debtors’ counsel, and other
consumer attorneys met Salazar with jubilation. For example, one

161. Id. at 822 (quoting Porter, supra note 160, at 148–49) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
162. Id. at 821–24. Contra Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., CIV No.
S-11-0642 KJM EFB, 2011 WL 3818560, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (holding that
the purpose of section 2932.5 is to give notice to prospective purchasers and mortgagees,
not to avoid confusion among borrowers).
163. Salazar, 448 B.R. at 822 (“Because controlling Supreme Court authority
requires this Court to enforce statutory borrower protections regardless of whether
nonjudicial foreclosure is sought under a mortgage or a deed of trust, the Court must
conclude Civil Code section 2932.5 applies to U.S. Bank’s [deed of trust] here.”).
164. Id. at 824.
165. Id. at 824 n.14 (citing Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006)).
166. Id.; see also id. at 824 (“To overlook statutory foreclosure requirements would
require legislative action, of which the Court is not capable. This Court instead joins the
courts in other states that have rejected MERS’ offer of an alternative to the public
recording system.” (citations omitted)). In so finding, the court rejected “U.S. Bank’s
invitation to overlook the statutory foreclosure mandates of California law, and rely upon
MERS as an extra-judicial commercial alternative.” Id. at 824 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. Since Salazar, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
California has had the opportunity to consider at least one other case with similar facts
and held once again that section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust. See In re Cruz, 457
B.R. 806, 814–16 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011).
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consumer attorney blog heralded the decision as taking MERS and the
lenders to task for their unjust attempts to avoid compliance with section
2932.5.168 Another blog praised Salazar’s “Good Issues, Great Holding,
and Excellent Decision.”169 The author described how foreclosure defense
attorneys were “waiting for some good cases to come out that clarify some
of the more nebulous concepts in foreclosure defense law. . . . While
everyone was talking about [section 2932.5] applying ONLY to mortgages,
the California Southern District [B]ankruptcy Court recently came down
and said hogwash . . . .”170 However, the danger with so much celebration,
and with taglines such as “California Lenders, Loan Servicers, MERS
and other foreclosing entities should ensure valid legal compliance with
California Civil Code Section 2932.5 or risk hav[ing] the foreclosure sale
being declared VOID (with no obligation to tender),” is that the advocates
of borrowers may appear to be celebrating the ability of borrowers to
escape from their obligations.171 This clearly was not the bankruptcy

168. Assignment of California Deed of Trust Must Be Recorded Before
Foreclosure—MERS Process Does Not Trump California Real Estate Law, CAL. REAL
ESTATE LAW. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.calrealestatelawyersblog.com/2011/04/
assignment-of-california-deed.html (“Bankruptcy courts in California have more readily
addressed the arrogance of the MERS cabal of lenders efforts to circumvent state law.”).
169. Steve Vondran, SHAZAM SALAZAR—Southern District Bankruptcy Court of
California Says California Civil Code Section 2932.5 Applies to Mortgages AND Deeds
of Trust—Wrongful Foreclosure Is Illuminated!, FORECLOSURE DEF. RESOURCE CENTER
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.foreclosuredefenseresourcecenter.com/2011/04/shazamsouthern-district-bankruptcy-court-of-california-says-california-civil-code-section-29325-applies-to-mortgages-and-deeds-of-trust.
170. Id.
171. Id. Debtors should be able to challenge foreclosures where the lender has
failed to obey the law, but in some cases the debtor is incapable of paying the loan
regardless of how the foreclosure process took place. See Steve Vondran, The Lender
Promises Not To Foreclose, Then They Sell the Property and Demand You Tender the
Loan Balance To Challenge the Sale, FORECLOSURE DEF. RESOURCE CENTER (Aug. 15,
2011), http://www.foreclosuredefenseresourcecenter.com/2011/08/can-the-lender-requiretender-of-the-loan-balance. Allowing such debtors to challenge foreclosures could
create frivolous legal proceedings. Id. Lenders may instead argue for the court to use
the tender rule that requires the debtor to pay the balance of the loan in order to
challenge the foreclosure. Id. (“[Lenders] will argue . . . that you cannot make a valid
legal challenge [to foreclosure] unless you can ‘tender the balance of the loan’ that you
owe on. . . . The principle is based on the fact that the court should not overturn a sale
for minor irregularities, if it just puts a borrower right back into a defaulting position and
where that result is deemed inequitable.”). For more information about the “spectrum”
of assignment and foreclosure deficiencies that courts wrestle with in determining the
severity of neglect by lenders and the factors that may lead to foreclosure dismissals,
with a focus on issues of standing, see generally Greenberg, supra note 118, at 253.
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court’s intent when it warned against the “serious distributional
consequences to all parties.”172
2. District Courts in California Respond: Rejecting Salazar
While consumer attorneys rejoiced, the district courts continued to
decide cases contrary to the detailed analysis and outcome of Salazar.173 In
response to Salazar, the district courts have provided more in-depth
discussions of the common law history and legislative purpose behind
section 2932.5 to conclude that section 2932.5 applies only to mortgages
and that providing protection to homeowners was never the legislature’s
motivation in enacting the statute.174
Perhaps the most detailed California district court case analysis after
Salazar is Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.175 The Pedersen
court recognized the similarities between mortgages and deeds of trust
and that California courts have treated them as practically the same.176
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that substantial differences remained,
such as the technical passage of title in a deed of trust, and found that such
differences still justified the conclusion that section 2932.5 does not
apply to deeds of trust.177 The court relied upon Stockwell as the last
word on the passage of title for the purposes of a deed of trust.178 However,
the court’s analysis lacked Aviel’s rejection of the obsolete lien versus

172. In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Porter,
supra note 160, at 148–49) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D.
Cal. 2012).
173. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., CIV No. S-11-0642
KJM EFB, 2011 WL 3818560, at *17–18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011).
174. See, e.g., id. at *18 (holding that section 2932.5’s purpose is to give notice to
purchasers and mortgagees).
175. See id. at *16–17 (discussing Salazar in great detail).
176. Id. at *17.
177. Id. at *18 (“In the mortgage, title remains with the mortgagor until a
foreclosure sale; then it passes from the mortgagor to the purchaser. In the deed of trust,
title passes to the trustee, who holds it until default; then, after sale, it goes from the
trustee to the purchaser. . . . Even though the trustee of a deed of trust holds title only ‘so
far as may be necessary to the execution of the trust,’ this difference underlies the
different application of section 2932.5.” (citations omitted) (quoting Bank of It. Nat’l
Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1933))).
178. Id. (“In Stockwell . . . the court found a directed sale valid, even though the
assignment of the deed of trust to the person who directed the sale had not been
recorded. It noted that . . . section 2932.5[] did not apply to deeds of trust. It reasoned
that in a mortgage, the authority of the mortgagee to sell must be clear, whereas with a
deed of trust, the trustee holds the title, ‘thus enabling him in executing the trust, to
transfer to the purchaser a marketable record title. It is immaterial who holds the note.’”
(quoting Stockwell v. Barnum, 94 P. 400, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908))).
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title theory, as well as Aviel’s rejection of cases prior to Bank of Italy for
the purpose of interpreting deeds of trust.179
The Pedersen court’s opinion was also unconcerned with the Salazar
court’s consumer protection policy to avoid confusion among borrowers
as well as prospective purchasers.180 Indeed, the Pedersen court concluded
that the sole purpose of section 2932.5 is to give notice to prospective
purchasers or mortgagees and that this recorded notice is unnecessary in
the case of a deed of trust because “the trustee conducts the sale and
transfers title, which sale and transfer carry a presumption of regularity.”181
The conflicting interpretations by Salazar and Pedersen demonstrate
the need for the California Legislature to intervene and clarify whether
section 2932.5’s sole purpose is to give notice to prospective purchasers,
such that borrower protection is not within its ambit, because the issue is
a question of legislative intent.182 Moreover, it is a question of legislative
intent as to whether the passage of “title” in the title theory of deeds of
trust should be completely abolished.183

179. Compare id. at *16–18, with Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App.
2008).
180. Pedersen, 2011 WL 3818560, at *18. Contra In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 821
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that section 2932.5 “protects borrowers from confusion
as to the ownership of their loans”), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
181. Pedersen, 2011 WL 3818560, at *18.
182. See People v. Hall, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 806, 814 (Ct. App. 2002) (“[W]e
interpret the clause in light of well-established principles of statutory construction. The
starting point for statutory construction is ‘the fundamental premise that the objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.’” (quoting People
v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154, 156 (Cal. 1987))); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 109 (2012)
(“When interpreting a statute, a court starts with language of statute to determine if the
words used unequivocally express the legislature’s intent given that the primary rule of
statutory construction, to which all other such rules are subject, is that the courts must
ascertain the intent of the legislature, whenever possible, in order to effectuate the
purpose of the law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1858 (West
2007) (“In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all.”).
183. See Hall, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814.
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3. For the First Time in a Century: A California Appellate
Court Discusses Section 2932.5
In 2011, for the first time since Stockwell in 1908, a California appellate
court addressed the question of whether section 2932.5 applies to deeds
of trust in Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.184 In its analysis, the court
relied in part on the reasoning of the federal district courts in California
and decided that, in California, deeds of trust have replaced mortgages,
and that section 2932.5 is now practically obsolete despite its references
to mortgages.185 The court gave great deference to the district courts and
agreed that Stockwell was the only case on point on the issue of whether
2932.5 applies to deeds of trust.186 Ultimately, the court held that because
Stockwell was never overruled it is still good law, thus solidifying
Stockwell’s holding that the recording of an assignment of a deed of trust
is not required for a valid foreclosure.187
Although Calvo used the same analysis as the district courts by relying
on Stockwell and distinguishing Bank of Italy, the decision failed to
analyze numerous other binding California precedents that discussed
deeds of trust. For example, Calvo neglected decisions such as Cornelison,
wherein the California Supreme Court held that mortgages with a power
of sale and deeds of trust are considered security interests and are treated
similarly.188 The Calvo court also failed to analyze the California Supreme
Court’s holding in Monterey that a deed of trust is, in practical effect, a
lien on the property.189 These holdings should put courts on notice that

184. Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 818–20 (Ct. App.
2011).
185. Id. at 819–21 (“In California, over the course of the past century, deeds of trust
have largely replaced mortgages as the primary real property security device. Thus,
section 2932.5 (and its predecessor, section 858) became practically obsolete and were
generally ignored by borrowers, creditors, and the California courts.” (citation omitted)).
186. Id. at 819.
187. Id. (“The holding of Stockwell has never been reversed or modified in any
reported California decision in the more than 100 years since the case was decided. The
rule that section 2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust is part of the law of real property
in California.”). The court distinguished Bank of Italy as not having decided the same
issue. Id. at 820 (“The court recognized there were an increasing number of cases that
applied the same rules to deeds of trust that are applied to mortgages and concluded that
‘merely because “title” passes by a deed of trust while only a “lien” is created by a
mortgage,’ in both situations the security must be exhausted before suit on the personal
obligation. Nothing in the holding or analysis of the Bank of Italy opinion supports
plaintiff’s position here that we should find section 2932.5 applies to a deed of trust.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P. 2d 940,
945 (Cal. 1933))).
188. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
189. Monterey S.P. P’ship v. W.L. Bankham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 626 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc) (“In practical effect, if not in legal parlance, a deed of trust is a lien on the
property. It would be inconsistent with Bank of Italy to deny the beneficiaries the rights
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deeds of trust have transformed since the Stockwell decision; although
the terminology remains regarding passage of “title,” the legal effect has
changed such that a deed of trust only creates a lien.
Even if the California Supreme Court’s language in Monterey was
unclear—in that the lien theory also applies to deeds of trust—the Calvo
court incorrectly gave more weight to a hundred-year-old opinion based
on the abandoned title theory than the California Court of Appeal’s
explicit rejection of cases based on “the obsolete lien versus title theory
historically relied on to differentiate the two security instruments.”190
The Calvo court ignored the highest authority and instead gave deference to
an ancient case decided by another panel of the court of appeal.191 Finally,
because of its weak analysis, the court was unable to assert a policy reason
to justify its adherence to stare decisis with regard to Stockwell, nor did
it explain its refusal to follow California Supreme Court analysis and more
recent appellate decisions to the contrary.192 Instead, the court engaged
in the same analysis as the district courts: Stockwell is the only case on
point, therefore we are bound to follow Stockwell.193 Accordingly, because
of mortgagees . . . merely because the beneficiaries’ security interest took the form of a
deed of trust, which conveys ‘title’ to a trustee. The deed of trust conveys ‘title’ to the
trustee ‘only so far as may be necessary to the execution of the trust.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting Lupertino v. Carbahal, 111 Cal. Rptr. 112, 115 (Ct. App. 1973))).
190. Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008) (“That theory has been
discredited by the more contemporary jurisprudence . . . which functionally equates the
two instruments and recognizes that a deed of trust, for all practical purposes, is a lien on
the property.”). The Calvo court held just the opposite when it reasoned that
the court in Bank of Italy did not hold that a mortgage is the same as a deed of
trust. Far from it; the Bank of Italy court recognized that the distinction
between a mortgage, which creates only a lien, and a deed of trust, which passes
title to the trustee, “has become well settled in our law and cannot now be
disturbed.”
Calvo, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 819–20 (quoting Bank of Italy, 20 P.2d at 944).
191. Calvo, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 819. The court ignored the California Supreme
Court’s holding in Monterey that a deed of trust creates a lien on the property as opposed
to transferring actual title. Monterey, 777 P.2d at 626.
192. The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy’
rather than ‘an inexorable command.’” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998)
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)); see also Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social
policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic
need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable,
when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its
scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.”).
193. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. While it is unclear as to why
the Calvo court so conclusively decided to follow Stockwell without an analysis of other
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of its weak analysis, Calvo should have little precedential weight, and
the uncertainty regarding the law of deeds of trust in California remains.194
4. The Reversal of Salazar by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
In March 2012, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California unambiguously resolved the conflict that had arisen among
the federal courts in California regarding the application of section
2932.5 by reversing and remanding the bankruptcy court’s Salazar
decision.195 Although the court engaged in a limited analysis of the
bankruptcy court’s reasoning and the Calvo court’s contrary reasoning,
the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit opinion Hayes v. County of
San Diego to essentially hold that its hands were tied.196 “In deciding an
issue of state law, when there is relevant precedent from the state’s
intermediate appellate court, the federal court must follow the state
intermediate appellate court decision unless the federal court finds
convincing evidence that the state’s supreme court likely would not
follow it.”197 Because the state appellate court already determined that
binding California cases, including those from the state’s supreme court, the court of
appeal’s heavy reliance on the district court cases that decided to follow Stockwell
suggests that the Calvo court had not engaged in much analysis of the issue beyond that
already accomplished by the district courts.
194. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 132 (2005) (“An appellate court should follow
established precedent unless there exists a compelling and urgent reason not to do so
which destroys or completely overshadows the policy or purpose which the precedent
established.” (citing Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1990))). Although
Calvo followed Stockwell as precedent, California courts had already rejected outdated
cases based on the obsolete title theory. See supra notes 78–91 and accompanying text.
Calvo failed to explain a compelling policy reason to justify not following the other
California courts, including the state’s supreme court, in adopting the modern lien
theory. See Calvo, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 819. Calvo also demonstrates the controversy
regarding the state of the law on deeds of trust in California: Is the passage of title
merely a remnant of an obsolete legal theory, or does it affect the actual passage of legal
title such that there is no gap in title of the sort section 2932.5 seeks to avoid? The
answer to the question is crucial to the debate. As the court noted in In re Cruz:
MERS argues that the assignee beneficiary need not record its interest to
prevent a gap in title. It again confuses the title to the lien of the deed of trust
with title to the Property. That MERS was the beneficiary of record even
though ING was the foreclosing beneficiary created a gap in title to the lien.
ING was a stranger to the record before the foreclosure giving rise to suspicion
that the sale was not authorized. This is the very risk that § 2932.5 was
intended to safeguard.
In re Cruz, 457 B.R. 806, 818 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011).
195. In re Salazar, 470 B.R. 557, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
196. See id. at 561 (citing Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 658 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir.
2011)).
197. Hayes, 658 F.3d at 870 (quoting Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d
993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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section 2932.5 did not apply to deeds of trust in Calvo, the district court
reviewing Salazar was bound to follow Calvo unless there was convincing
evidence that the California Supreme Court would not follow Calvo.198
Rather than engage in an analysis of California Supreme Court decisions
discussing deeds of trust to determine whether the state’s high court
would follow Calvo’s reasoning,199 the district court simply held that the
California Supreme Court would probably follow Calvo because it denied
the Calvo plaintiff’s petition for review.200 It is truly odd that the district
court decided to draw an inference as to whether the California Supreme
Court would follow Calvo based on its denial of review because the district
court would have been forbidden from drawing similar conclusions based
on United States Supreme Court denials of certiorari.201 Given such
questionable judicial reasoning, the California Legislature must no longer
leave this issue in the hands of the courts; it must amend the foreclosure
statutes to define deeds of trust in light of the modern lien theory.
VI. REVISION OF CALIFORNIA STATUTES GOVERNING DEEDS OF TRUST
IS NECESSARY TO REMEDY UNCERTAINTY OF THE LAW
The uncertainty that both consumers and lenders face due to the
ambiguous state of the law governing deeds of trust would be avoided if
the California Legislature amended the state code to reflect the important
changes that have occurred in California over the last century: (1) the
198. Salazar, 470 B.R. at 561–62.
199. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the California Supreme Court’s
rejection of the outdated title theory and cases predating Bank of Italy, which would
include Stockwell. Had the district court analyzed these cases, it should have come to the
conclusion that Calvo was based on Stockwell, a case that has been implicitly overruled.
See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
200. Salazar, 470 B.R. at 561 (“To the contrary, the California Supreme Court
denied the plaintiff’s petition for review, which suggests it would indeed follow the
Court of Appeal decision.”).
201. See Blair C. Warner, The Hypocrisy of the Acquiescence Canon 12 (Mar.
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/blair_warner/2
(“When it comes to the persuasiveness of the Supreme Court’s own inactivity, the Court
has made it clear that no weight should be given to the denial of certiorari. Justice
Stevens and Justice Frankfurter stated repeatedly that the orders of the Court denying
certiorari have no precedential significance at all.” (citing Jeff Bleich & Deborah
Pearlstein, Dissenting from Not Deciding: Clues About What the Law Might Become—
And How It Will Get There, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2002, at 13, 16)); see also Missouri
v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995) (“Of course, ‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told
many times.’” (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))).
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rejection of the title theory in favor of the lien theory,202 and (2) the
rejection of mortgages in favor of deeds of trust.203 Numerous states have
statutory provisions that provide examples for how California could
amend its code to eliminate the current ambiguity.204 In addition,
recognizing the legitimacy of MERS as a private alternative to public
recording, provided that it maintains easy public access, could allow the
real estate market to see the benefits of large scale deed of trust transfers
while ensuring consumers the ability to monitor the status of their loans.205
Nonetheless, solely embracing MERS as an alternative recordation system
would fail to resolve the confusion that led to so much litigation regarding
deeds of trust in California.206 Therefore, amending the statutes governing
deeds of trust should take precedence.

202. Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008).
203. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1 (“The use of a conveyance to a trustee
clothed with a power of sale offered the creditor several advantages over the mortgage so
that, by the time the distinctions between the two security instruments were removed
during the early part of the 20th century, the deed of trust had become the generally
accepted and preferred security device in California.”).
204. For examples of how other states define deeds of trust, see, for example, the
state codes of Oregon and Alaska. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.715 (2011) (“A trust deed is
deemed to be a mortgage on real property and is subject to all laws relating to mortgages
on real property except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with the provisions
of ORS 86.705 to 86.795, in which event the provisions of ORS 86.705 to 86.795 shall
control. For the purpose of applying the mortgage laws, the grantor in a trust deed is
deemed the mortgagor and the beneficiary is deemed the mortgagee.”); ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.20.110 (Supp. 2011) (“Trust Deeds Recorded as Mortgages. For the purposes of
record, a deed of trust, given to secure an indebtedness, shall be treated as a mortgage of
real estate, and recorded in full in the book provided for mortgages of real property. The
person who makes or executes the deed of trust shall be indexed as ‘mortgagor,’ and the
trustee and the beneficiary . . . as the ‘mortgagees.’”).
205. See Dordan, supra note 2, at 205–06. Whether or not large scale pooling and
transferring of deeds of trust and mortgages is in fact beneficial to the economy is in
dispute. Id. at 205 (“By electronically and cheaply recording assignments of notes,
MERS does provide a service that probably somewhat lowers the cost of obtaining
mortgages and makes a sale of the mortgage easier on the secondary market. Even
though there has been much abuse in the secondary markets and for all its faults, the
secondary market does have a positive effect of freeing up credit which can give more
homeowners access to loans.” (footnote omitted)). But see Peterson, supra note 105, at
1398 (“While there is plenty of blame to go around, the MERS recording and foreclosure
system was an additional contributing cause of the American mortgage foreclosure crisis.
MERS facilitates predatory structured finance by decreasing the exit costs of originators.”).
206. See supra Part III.A; see also MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1
(discussing how deeds of trust are the preferred security device in California, and yet
they lack statutory definition).
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A. Oregon’s Code Provides Guidance in Defining
and Regulating Deeds of Trust
Instead of relying on the interpretive powers of the California courts,
the California Legislature could find a plausible model for redrafting its
statutes governing deeds of trust in Oregon’s Revised Statutes. The
source of confusion in California is largely due to the enactment of
amendments that failed to update the code according to changing notions
favoring the lien theory over the harsh effect of the title theory of mortgages
and deeds of trust.207 The failure to update the California Civil Code led
to the conflict in the federal courts as to whether the same rules that
govern mortgages also govern deeds of trust in California.208 In contrast,
Oregon Revised Statutes section 86.715 explicitly recognizes that deeds
of trust are deemed mortgages and governed by the same laws.209 The
statute’s clear definition of a trust deed as a mortgage provides the courts
guidance in that the legislative intent is clear and the courts need not rely
solely on ambiguous language in cases holding that deeds of trust are in
legal terminology one thing, while in effect only mortgages.210
Oregon’s code also unambiguously requires the trustee to record the
assignment of a deed of trust in a nonjudicial foreclosure for a valid
foreclosure.211 Although lenders and the financial industry might object
207. The legislature, when revising the code, saw fit to simply move section 2932.5
wholesale from the section governing “Uses and Trusts” to the section governing
“Mortgages” without also specifying in the provision whether or not it applied to both
mortgages and deeds of trust. Section 2932.5 was originally section 858 but “succeeded
to § 858 verbatim as part of the 1986 technical revisions to California trust law.” In re
Cruz, 457 B.R. 806, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Recommendation Proposing the
Trust Law, 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REP. 1207, 1483 (1986); Conforming
Revisions, 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REP. 753, 764 (1985)).
208. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For another way to avoid this
dilemma, see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-805 (Supp. 2011): “Deeds of trust may be
executed as security for the performance of a contract or contracts. Except with respect
to chapter 6 of this title, statutes of this state which refer to mortgages as security
instruments are deemed to also include deeds of trust, unless the context otherwise
requires.” Id.
209. See supra note 204.
210. See, e.g., Monterey S.P. P’ship v. W.L. Bankham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 626
(Cal. 1989) (en banc).
211. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (Supp. 2012) (“A trustee may foreclose a trust deed
by advertisement and sale in the manner provided in ORS 86.740 to 86.755 if: (1) The
trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any
appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in the mortgage records in the counties
in which the property described in the deed is situated . . . .”); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 45-1505 (Supp. 2012) (“Foreclosure of trust deed, when—The trustee may foreclose a
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to such a revision to California’s deed of trust law, arguing that it is too
favorable to borrowers who would later try to escape their obligations of
repayment, Oregon’s statute requiring public recordation of transfers
before a valid foreclosure also allows the recording to take place until
the point of foreclosure.212 This flexibility allows lenders to correct any
deficiencies, such as the lack of a recording of assignments, at any time
prior to initiating the foreclosure, thereby preventing courts from finding
reasons to invalidate foreclosures.213 Therefore, if California adopted a
statute similar to Oregon’s, it would not overburden lenders enough to
justify backlash against political leaders.
For example, Ekerson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System
demonstrates how Oregon’s code resolves the problems in cases similar
to those causing confusion in federal courts sitting in California.214 In
Ekerson, the court granted the plaintiff a temporary restraining order to
prevent a challenged foreclosure under a deed of trust.215 The plaintiff
granted a deed of trust to Citibank.216 The court noted that MERS became
“an assignee of the original lender,” and assigned the beneficial interest
under the deed of trust to Citimortgage.217 Finally, another party, CalWestern Reconveyance, was named as the trustee in charge of the
foreclosure sale, causing even greater confusion for the borrower.218 The
court found that the foreclosure violated section 86.735 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes, stating “[t]he problem that defendants run into in this
case is an apparent failure to record assignments necessary for the
foreclosure.” 219 Applying the statute’s unambiguous language, the

trust deed by advertisement and sale under this act if: (1) The trust deed, any assignments
of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor
trustee are recorded in mortgage records in the counties in which the property described
in the deed is situated . . . .”).
212. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735.
213. See Efrati, supra note 16 (commenting on how the harsh effects of foreclosures
on borrowers following the collapse of the real estate market has led to judicial activism,
with some judges finding ways to invalidate foreclosures).
214. Ekerson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 11-CV-178-HU, 2011 WL
597056, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2011).
215. Id. at *1 (following the standard laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court, in that the
plaintiff was (1) “likely to succeed on the merits, (2) [was] likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and
(4) an injunction is in the public interest.” (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008))); id. at *4 (granting temporary restraining order).
216. Id. at *1. That Oregon treats deeds of trust as mortgages is apparent from the
court’s reference to Citibank as mortgagee. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *3. In its reasoning, the Ekerson court cited an earlier case, Burgett v.
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, for its denial of the motion for summary
judgment brought by the defendant—also MERS in that case—because of the “failure to
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court held that the plaintiff “established MERS, who was the recorded
beneficiary of the trust deed, assigned successor trustees to the trust deed
but failed to record the appointment of any successor trustee as required
before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale may be conducted under Oregon
law.”220
As seen above, Oregon’s statutory system provides a workable example
of deeds of trust that California should adopt. The Oregon code describes
deeds of trust in relation to mortgages and describes the legal consequences
of failing to record deeds of trust.221 Additionally, the selected statutes
are not overly burdensome on lenders because they also allow prior
unrecorded assignments to be filed in connection with a foreclosure.222
Whereas federal courts sitting in Oregon have clear statutes to guide their
decisions, federal courts in California must reconstruct the history of
deeds of trust in California’s common law over the course of a century.223
The need for California district courts to analyze cases dating as far back
as 1908 in order to translate statutes that apply to everyday transactions
demonstrates that it is time for the California Legislature to amend the
statutes governing deeds of trust.
B. Another Alternative to Public Recording: Embracing MERS
and the Private Recording System
Although Oregon’s statutory scheme offers a possibility for revision,
it would likely be met with political resistance from lenders and the
finance industry. Requiring the public recordation of assignments would
also fail to solve the problems of market demand for mortgage and deed
of trust transfers and the expenses of recording such transfers that MERS
seeks to avoid.224 Instead of denying MERS the ability to circumvent the

record assignments necessary for the foreclosure.” Id. (quoting Burgett v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration System, No. 09 6244 HO, 2010 WL 4282105, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2010)).
220. Id. at *4.
221. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.715 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (Supp. 2012).
222. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part V.A–B.
224. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text; see also McIntire, supra note
1 (“Although the average person has never heard of it, MERS . . . holds 60 million
mortgages on American homes, through a legal maneuver that has saved banks more
than $1 billion over the last decade but made life maddeningly difficult for some troubled
homeowners. Created by lenders seeking to save millions of dollars on paperwork and
public recording fees every time a loan changes hands, MERS is a confidential
computer registry for trading mortgage loans.”).
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recording statutes, or reading deeds of trusts out of the statutes requiring
recordation of mortgage assignments, California could adopt a “peaceful
existence” approach, wherein it recognizes MERS as a private alternative to
public recording as long as it maintains public access to its database.225
Under the peaceful existence approach, the real estate market benefits from
lower costs, the public has greater access to credit, and the public has access
to the same information that the public recording system seeks to ensure.226
However, the legislature still must address other considerations, such
as “technical aspects of standing to foreclose, title and lien searches, and
other aspects of real estate practice [that] remain to be considered in every
transaction.”227
In addition to the peaceful existence approach, the California
Legislature could examine the MERS system and propose requirements
that the system meet all the information-providing characteristics of the
public system, thereby allowing the private system of recording to be a
true alternative to the public system.228 Any confusion resulting from
dual recording systems would be minimal because an interested party
would only need to check the MERS system if the information was not

225. See Dordan, supra note 2, at 206 (“A solution to MERS’s transparency
problem would be opening up its database to the public. The primary complaint with
MERS is that it holds the information regarding the chain of title out of reach of the
public.” (footnote omitted)); see also Valenza, supra note 107, at 272 (using the term
“peaceful existence” to describe Dordan’s approach based on the title of Dordan’s
comment). Indeed, Delaware has already reined in MERS by requiring MERS to provide
public access to accurate information regarding its mortgages. See MERS Reaches
Agreement, supra note 3. Delaware’s Attorney General filed suit and MERS agreed to
make certain concessions ensuring that homeowners can find out accurate information
from MERS when trying to save their homes from foreclosure. Id.
226. Although courts do not agree whether the recording system is meant to provide
notice to only purchasers and mortgagees or to borrowers as well, both groups are part of
the public that benefits from the public recording system. See In re Salazar, 448 B.R.
814, 821 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (discussing how statutes requiring public recording of
deed of trust transfers protect borrowers by providing them information about their
loans), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012). But see Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg.
Funding, Inc., CIV No. S-11-0642 KJM EFB, 2011 WL 3818560, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Aug,
29, 2011) (holding that public recording statutes are meant to provide notice to
purchasers of loans and mortgagees, but not to borrowers). For a discussion of the
benefits that MERS’s system would provide to the public and the real estate market, see
Dordan, supra note 2, which notes that “[b]y electronically and cheaply recording
assignments of notes, MERS does provide a service that probably somewhat lowers the
cost of obtaining mortgages and makes a sale of the mortgage easier on the secondary
market.” Id. at 205 Dordan explains that this secondary market frees up credit, giving
more homeowners access to loans. Id.
227. Valenza, supra note 107, at 273.
228. See Dordan, supra note 2, at 206 (recommending ways for MERS to be used to
benefit the public).

238

[VOL. 50: 197, 2013]

Left to Their Own (Security) Devices
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

available in the public records office.229 The viability of a private system
would require the California Legislature to draft statutes that lay out the
requirements of the private system such that it would account for the
needs of both consumers—such as readily available information on the
parties that hold an interest in their loan and the power to foreclose—and
prospective purchasers and mortgagees.230
C. Revising the Statutory Scheme Governing Deeds of Trust Must
Take Precedence over Embracing Private Recording
Although legislative approval of private recording systems that allow
easy public access may provide benefits to consumers and lenders, such
a solution should not take precedence over revising the statutory scheme
governing deeds of trust in California. Even if MERS were recognized
as a legitimate alternative to public recording, the California Civil Code
would remain unclear as to whether any recording of a deed of trust
assignment is required for a valid foreclosure.231 Admittedly, the potential
for litigation is reduced with public access to systems like MERS,232 but
lenders and financial institutions could continue to assign deeds of trust
without MERS’s involvement. Furthermore, California courts continue
to dispute which provisions governing mortgages also apply to deeds of
trust.233

229. See Valenza, supra note 107, at 260 (discussing how MERS claims to
efficiently track mortgage transfers in its system). Another option, instead of having the
private system alongside the public system, would be to leave it to the state legislatures
to amend the recording process to keep up with the multitude of mortgage and deed of
trust transfers, but such a solution may only lead to further confusion. See Dordan, supra
note 2, at 206 (“Perhaps states and localities could come up with simpler ways to record
assignments that may be less cumbersome and give some of the benefits of MERS, but
these would still be uneven systems with different localities having different recording
systems.”).
230. See supra notes 202–06 and accompanying text.
231. The legislature’s recognition of MERS would allow the use of the MERS
recording system as an alternative to the public recording system, but courts would still
be without guidance as to whether the recording of an assignment of a deed of trust,
through a private system or a public system, is even required for a valid foreclosure.
Although the majority of deed of trust assignments in California are recorded in the
MERS system, there is still a substantial portion that are not. See Dordan, supra note 2,
at 177 (discussing how MERS is “listed as the mortgagee of record on approximately
two out of three newly originated residential mortgages nationwide”).
232. See id. at 206.
233. See supra Part III.A.
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Thus, simply recognizing MERS as a valid alternative to public recording
would fail to solve the root of the problem—deeds of trust have overtaken
mortgages as the preferred security device in California, yet they lack a
statutory definition.234 The California Legislature saw the need to define
mortgages and provide a statutory scheme to govern them.235 Therefore,
it is necessary that the legislature fulfill its duty to keep the laws current
and amend those provisions to reflect the modern lien theory and the
pervasive use of deeds of trust instead of mortgages.236
The legislature should adopt a provision similar to those found in
Arizona, Alaska, and Oregon that provide that deeds of trust are governed
by the same laws that govern mortgages, except where they conflict with
other statutes specifically governing the use of deeds of trust.237 In addition,
the California Legislature should amend section 2932.5 to expressly cover
deeds of trust in order to provide consumers with information regarding the
status of their loan, avoid gaps in title, and allow lenders to avoid
unnecessary foreclosure challenges.238 Finally, only after such revisions
are made should the legislature consider allowing the use of private
alternatives to public recording to benefit the economy and the public.
VII. CONCLUSION
The drastic rise in home foreclosures created a chaotic scenario for
courts faced with home foreclosures and bankruptcies, a chaotic scenario
that was only aggravated by the ambiguity of the California Civil Code
provisions that govern deeds of trust.239 Courts, as well as the authors of
leading treatises in the field, cannot agree whether or not section 2932.5
applies to both mortgages and deeds of trust.240 The cause of this ambiguity
is largely due to the fact that deeds of trust are not statutorily defined—
they are only referred to peripherally in the code provisions that discuss
mortgages.241 The state of the law is perplexing, considering that deeds

234. MILLER & STARR, supra note 10, § 10:1.
235. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2920–2967 (West 2012).
236. See Aviel v. Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[The title] theory
[of mortgages] has been discredited by the more contemporary jurisprudence discussed
above, which functionally equates the two instruments and recognizes that a deed of
trust, for all practical purposes, is a lien on the property.”); see also Calvo v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 821 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing how deeds of trust
have overtaken mortgages as the preferred real estate security devices in California and
how statutes governing mortgages have become practically obsolete).
237. See supra notes 204, 208, 211.
238. Idaho and Oregon provide examples of how section 2932.5 could be amended
to include deeds of trust. See supra note 211.
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See supra Parts III.B, V.
241. See supra note 28.
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of trust are the preferred security device for real estate in California, and
mortgages are rarely used.242 Therefore, the California Legislature should,
at the very least, statutorily define deeds of trust, much like Alaska,
Arizona, and Oregon.243 Given the changes in how the California Supreme
Court has interpreted deeds of trust in the past century, these statutory
definitions should account for California’s rejection of the title theory of
deeds of trust, finally putting to rest an aged California “anomaly” that is
“obsolete.”244 Because California courts apply similar rules to deeds of
trust and mortgages,245 it only makes sense to specify in the code that the
same rules apply unless they conflict. Furthermore, the California
Legislature should follow the example of Oregon and Idaho and include
the term deed of trust in the statutes that mention mortgages, such as the
recordation statutes, where confusion could easily be avoided.246
However, these revisions may fail to account for the market demand
for high-volume mortgage and deed of trust transfers, the demand that
MERS was formed to meet.247 The legislature should conduct a study on
whether these high-volume transfers are a form of commerce it should
endorse, or at the very least allow.248 The legislature should then consider
allowing the private system of recording as a valid alternative to the
public system where private recording complies with certain requirements
the legislature would set forth in legislative amendments to protect both
lenders and borrowers.249 But the focus on such a study should only
come after the legislature makes revisions clarifying the statutory scheme
and should not take precedence over the need to statutorily define deeds
of trust in California.

242. See supra Part II.A; see also Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr.
3d 815, 821 (Ct. App. 2011).
243. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.110 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-805 (2007);
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.715 (2011); supra Part VI.A.
244. Bank of It. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 945 (Cal. 1933)
(describing the historical nature of deeds of trust in California as “anomalous”); Aviel v.
Ng, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008) (describing the title theory as “obsolete”).
245. With the exception of the recent Calvo decision that based its adherence to the
old title theory on the reasoning in Stockwell. See supra Part V.C.3.
246. See supra note 211.
247. See supra notes 106–11.
248. See Peterson, supra note 105, at 1398 (identifying several MERS-related factors
that have enabled predatory lending and may have contributed to the mortgage foreclosure
crisis).
249. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
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The legislature must fulfill its lawmaking function and recognize that
its outdated, ambiguous laws create confusion for the courts.250 It is a
great disservice to homeowners who suffer from uncertainty when faced
with losing their homes for the California Legislature to allow deeds of
trust to remain undefined and to leave the California Civil Code reflecting
an understanding of deeds of trust based on the title theory that became
obsolete decades ago.

250.

242

See supra Part V.

